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ABSTRACT 
The author of this thesis asserts that the current mass care response capability of 
the state of Missouri is insufficient to meet the sheltering, feeding and bulk distribution 
needs of the projected affected population in a catastrophic disaster. This thesis focuses 
on a catastrophic seismic event along the New Madrid fault zone resulting in an 
earthquake with a Richter scale reading approximating 7.7 or higher to determine the 
baseline mass care needs. A capability gap exists due to an insufficient number of trained, 
qualified mass care volunteers.  
Correcting this deficiency requires a new approach including the modification of 
the current management structure and the active participation and collaboration between 
all levels of government, volunteer organizations and the private sector. The author 
proposes concepts that appear to be basic in nature to emergency managers, but when 
presented to the volunteer community were welcomed, but perceived as progressive. 
These corrective actions include a state-wide recruiting effort, standardized training and a 
more hierarchal management structure within the Emergency Support Function 6. 
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The state of Missouri struggles with the challenge of improving its disaster 
response. In the past few years, positive strides have been made in interoperable 
communications, collaborative command and control, large scale resource management 
as well as some improvement in mass care and volunteer coordination. Much of the 
improvement in the area of mass care has been a direct result of practice through 
repetition. 1  
This thesis focuses on catastrophic disaster mass care preparedness and response 
as defined in the National Response Framework (NRF), Emergency Support Function 6 
(ESF-6).2 ESF-6 covers all areas of mass care including housing and human services. 
Since this is too broad of an area to effectively address within this document the author 
has limited the research to the three areas most critical for sustaining life in mass care: 
mass sheltering, mass feeding and the bulk distribution of critical necessities such as 
packaged meals, ice, water, blankets and other basic mass care supplies.3 
The state has experienced nine federal disaster declarations since March of 2006, 
including tornadoes, storm damage, floods and ice storms. Compare this with Missouri’s 
sister states within Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII, 
Kansas, six; Nebraska, six; and Iowa, four. The Midwest has been particularly hard hit 
during this time period when compared to other states for the same time period that 
traditionally expect a higher incidence of disaster such as California, four; Florida, two; 
and Texas, five.4 These non-catastrophic disasters present response challenges, but rarely 
                                                 
1 Mass care is normally provided during and immediately after an emergency/disaster until services 
such as power, water and sewage treatment can be provided. Mass care needs include emergency shelter, 
and emergency provisions of food, water, basic First Aid, and other essential needs. Mass care is included 
in the Human Services Branch of the SEOC during disaster response and recovery operations. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2008). 
3 Dante Gliniecki (Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, Volunteer Coordinator), interview 
by author, January 19, 2006. 
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “2009 Federal Disaster Declaration,” data base tool, 
http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema (accessed February 26, 2008). 
 2
affect more than 50 of Missouri’s 115 counties, require only moderate levels of mass care 
resource mobilization and do not typically impact entire counties.5  
Due to the numbers of recent non-catastrophic disasters, the state has provided 
shelter for more disaster victims than ever before. This increase in shelter activity has 
resulted in an increase in mass care capability. This increase in capability has not come 
about through an organized preparedness effort, but rather through the responsible 
organizations expanding their effort through a reactionary and ad-hoc modality during 
actual disaster response. One might question the state’s ability to provide repeatable and 
consistent mass care response given the limited formal foundation on which the current 
plan is based. In addition, large-scale mass care and sheltering of the type required by a 
catastrophic disaster has yet to be adequately addressed.  
While the increase in disaster response activity is a factor in the improvement of 
many areas of disaster preparedness and response within the state, the greatest areas of 
improvement do not include mass care response. The major limiting factor for Missouri is 
a lack of capacity in the delivery of mass care services in a catastrophic event. The 
current state and local shelter capacity is approximately under 1 percent of the 
population. The undocumented recommended sheltering capacity goal is 10 percent of 
the population within the projected affected area and if met would increase the efficiency 
of state operations and reduce the need for EMAC and federal assistance for the provision 
of shelter staffing.6 
The current limited capacity is due to a lack of strategic guidance, the blending of 
disaster planning modalities, inadequate funding and limited recruiting and coordination 
of the available volunteers within the state. A sufficient number of facilities for shelters 
have been identified within the state, but there are not enough trained staff to adequately 
operate the shelters in a catastrophic disaster response. 
The provision of a state-level strategic goal or end state related to the overall mass 
care capacity coupled with adequate funding would provide a baseline for the necessary 
                                                 
5 The exception is ice storms, which do usually impact entire counties. 
6 Gliniecki, interview, 2006. 
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disaster response planning. This planning should follow a single planning model; in this 
case the FEMA recommended all-hazards model outlined in the FEMA Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide 101.7 Also recommended is the adoption of a more vertical or 
hierarchal management structure within the Emergency Support Function 6 with the 
stronger and larger traditional volunteer response organizations assuming the operational 
management of the sheltering, feeding and bulk distribution functions. This structure, 
combined with an active volunteer recruiting and training program by state government, 
should move mass care disaster response capacity closer to the desired level as well as 
reduce the number of emergent shelters during disaster response as they will be included 
in the process prior to the onset of the event. 
Mass care has received less attention than the more traditional fire service, law 
enforcement and emergency medical service from the executive level within the state 
during the recent cycle of improvements initiated by the events of September 11, 2001 
and Hurricane Katrina. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the bulk of available 
homeland security grant program funding and additional staff at the state level was 
primarily allocated for the purchase of communications systems, law enforcement and 
fire equipment, grant management, training and exercises.  
The provision of mass care logistical support is effective once the need has been 
identified and verified. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) coordinates the 
support requirements for the American Red Cross (ARC) shelters identified in 
preparedness plans effectively, but is challenged to identify the locations and logistical 
needs of emergent shelters, much less their actual populations. These emergent shelters 
are operated by well-intentioned local organizations and are opened and populated 
spontaneously without adequate visibility from local and state emergency managers. Due 
to their spontaneous nature, state and local emergency managers can not adequately plan 
for the needed logistics these local emergent shelters require. As a result, the emergency 
                                                 
7 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Producing 
Emergency Plans: A Guide for All-Hazard Operations Planning for State, Territorial, Local, and Tribal 
Governments, Interim Version 1.0 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 2-2 - 2-5, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/cpg_101_interim.pdf (accessed February 6, 2009). 
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management structure must provide these resources in an ad-hoc manner. This unplanned 
response is a drain on resources and contributes to the problem rather than the solution. 
During the ice storm of 2002, Missouri experienced the largest mass care 
operation recorded by the State Emergency Management Agency. The primary and 
support agencies at the state level responsible for sheltering function failed to perform 
satisfactorily. Out of 64 operational shelters, the primary and support agencies were only 
able to manage eight.8 Fifty-six of the operating shelters were established and run by 
volunteer organizations without coordination, support or guidance from state 
government. While this may have worked for the short duration and limited scale of this 
particular event, the lack of sufficient logistical support would create a significant 
shortfall of supplies in a catastrophic event. 
Addressing these concerns requires review of the mass care disaster response 
capabilities in the various volunteer organizations and state agencies within the state of 
Missouri. This effort should determine the sufficiency of emergency response and 
resource capability to meet the mass care requirements dictated by the greatest threat to 
the state. The most significant catastrophic threat Missouri faces is a potential earthquake 
along the New Madrid fault line. The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) last 
experienced significant earthquakes during the winter of 1811 and 1812, estimated to 
have been between 7.5 and 8.0 on the Richter scale.9  
Given the historical precedence set by the 1811/12 earthquakes, it is only prudent 
that Missouri assume the potential for another earthquake of similar magnitude and 
prepare accordingly. This makes it an ideal standard for judging the state of mass care 
preparedness in the state against the “worst case” scenario.10 For preparedness purposes, 
an earthquake along the New Madrid Earthquake Fault line of approximately 7.7 on the 
                                                 
8 Gliniecki, interview, 2006. 
9 Thomas G. Hildenbrand,Victoria E. Langenheim, Eugene Schweig, Peter H. Stauffer, and James W. 
Hendley II, “Uncovering Hidden Hazards in the Mississippi Valley,” United States Geological Survey, 
http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/prepare/factsheets/HiddenHazs/index.html (accessed November 10, 2008). 
10 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “Annex F” in Missouri State Emergency 
Management Agency Hazard Analysis (Jefferson City, MO: Missouri State Emergency Management 
Agency, 2007), http://sema.dps.mo.gov/HazardAnalysis/AnnexF.pdf (accessed February 27, 2008). 
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Richter scale has been adopted by the Central United States Earthquake Coalition 
(CUSEC), including Missouri, as the planning standard.11 If Missouri can meet the 
projected mass care requirements for this event, it can efficiently meet the requirements 
of disasters with less impact. 
Missourians have often heard the potential of a large scale New Madrid 
earthquake being referred to as the Midwest’s Hurricane Katrina. While there is some 
element of truth to this statement, it misses the mark as the sheer volume of geographic 
territory impacted by a New Madrid seismic event dwarfs the area impacted by Hurricane 
Katrina. Katrina was forecast in advance and residents had an opportunity to evacuate or 
at the least, prepare for its arrival. A New Madrid event will violently strike without 
warning and create destruction over a large area.” According to the Executive Director of 
CUSEC, Jim Wilkinson “There are 11 million people at risk in the Central United 
States.”12 The expected area of impact stretches from central Missouri to northwest 
Alabama and from southern Indiana to south-central Arkansas. Jim Wilkinson added that 
there could be as many as 4,300 people killed and another 65,000 injured in a 7.7 
earthquake. As many as 179,000 homes and 500 bridges could be destroyed.13 
The earthquake prediction estimates referenced in this document are based on an 
initial seismic event and due to a high number of independent variables involved. These 
estimates do not include subsequent aftershocks or repeated earthquakes in the same area. 
Accurate predictions concerning the cumulative damage to structures and lives lost from 
people remaining steadfastly within unsafe or weakened structures from the multiple 
quakes and hundreds or thousands of expected aftershocks over the following year are as 
difficult to predict. The numbers of affected populations may be greater than indicated in 
this document.  
                                                 
11 Eugene Schweig to Jim Wilkinson, January 20, 2005, “New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenarios,” 
United States Geological Survey. 
12 Jim Wilkinson (Executive Director of the Central United States Earthquake Consortium), interview 
by Tom Charlier, “A Day of Disaster in Mid-South,” ShowMe Net, 
http://www.showme.net/~fkeller/quake/lib/memphis1.htm (accessed December 11, 2005). 
13 Wilkinson, interview. 
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A. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
How should the mass care response capabilities and response plans of the state of 
Missouri be improved in order to effectively address the threat of a New Madrid seismic 
event in excess of 7.7 on the Richter Scale and minimize the need for federal assistance?  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of available material related to mass care response to catastrophic 
disaster within the traditional academic arena yields little in the way of valuable 
information. The author was unable to uncover any formal studies or previous research 
directly addressing this topic. This appears to be an untapped research area that if given 
the considerable attention it deserves could save many lives in the future.  
The available literature on this subject is primarily in the form of government and 
non-governmental organizational disaster plans, threat analyses along with historic 
sources on previous disasters and the current threat they pose and governmental post-
disaster and exercise after action reviews.  
The governmental emergency response plans include the federal National 
Response Framework and the state plans provided by five of the states with membership 
in.14 While a valuable amount of general disaster response information exists within these 
plans, little of it pertains to mass care and even less to mass care response in a 
catastrophic event. The general focus of the mass care sections of these plans is on the 
assignment of overall responsibility and authority with little information on how any of 
 
 
                                                 
14 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework; Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency, Illinois Emergency Operations Plan, Springfield, IL: Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency, 2004; Arkansas Emergency Management Agency, Arkansas Emergency Operations 
Plan, Little Rock, AR: Arkansas Emergency Management Agency, Little Rock, AR: 2005; Tennessee 
Emergency Management Agency, Tennessee Emergency Support Function 6 Plan, Nashville, TN: 
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, 2006; Alabama Department of Human Resources, Alabama 
Welfare Services Disaster Response Plan, Montgomery, AL: Alabama Department of Human Resources, 
2006; Department of Public Safety and State Emergency Management Agency, Missouri State Emergency 
Operations Plan, Jefferson City, MO: Missouri Department of Public Safety, 2006. 
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the necessary tasks are to be accomplished or what technical or management systems 
may be needed. These plans were all written using the all-hazards approach encouraged 
by FEMA. 
Non-governmental organization plans vary widely in their level of detail. These 
plans fall into three basic categories: the well-written American Red Cross (ARC) and the 
Salvation Army (TSA) plans that contain sufficient detail to provide actual guidance 
during an event, organizations with limited disaster plans and organizations that have not 
developed any formal disaster plans.15 The more successfully designed plans of the ARC 
and TSA offer both management practices and technical systems that would prove 
beneficial if implemented on a larger scale within the governmental structure of disaster 
mass care response. 
The federal post-disaster reports focus primarily on Hurricane Katrina response as 
this is the disaster response that most closely approximates the levels of damage and 
demand for mass care within the United States in recent years. Many of the publications 
point out general failures without providing enough specifics or potential corrective 
actions. An exception to these is the U.S. House of Representatives report titled A Failure 
of Initiative.16 This report documents specific systematic failures in preparedness, 
including incident management, displaced persons tracking and shelter management as 
well as other deficiencies that are relevant to the current disaster preparedness challenge 
to Missouri that a New Madrid seismic event presents. Other documents of value are the 
                                                 
15American Red Cross, Missouri Capital Area Chapter Disaster Response Plan, Jefferson City, MO: 
American Red Cross, 2003; American Red Cross, “Disaster Services Program Guidance,” (internal 
document, American Red Cross, Capital Region Chapter, Jefferson City, MO, 2007); American Red Cross, 
“National Shelter System Support Training Guide,” (internal document, American Red Cross, Capital 
Region Chapter, Jefferson City, MO, 2007); The Salvation Army; Salvation Army Manual of Standard 
Operating Guidelines and Policies, (internal document, The Salvation Army, Jefferson, MO, 1991); TSA 
Kansas and Western Missouri Division Emergency Disaster Services Divisional, TSA Kansas and Western 
Missouri Division Emergency Disaster Services Divisional Disaster Plan, Kansas City, MO: TSA Kansas 
and Western Missouri Division Emergency Disaster Services, 2004.  
16 House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, U.S. House of representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 
the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 2006, H. Rep. 109-377. 
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Senate version Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Executive Summary) and 
the DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hot-wash, Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana.17 
While these documents are helpful, it is important to remember that they were 
authored within agencies of the federal government and tend to focus on the federal 
response. It would have proven much more interesting had the author been successful in 
the attempt to obtain copies of the internal after action reports from the state of Louisiana 
and the city of New Orleans.  
Given the frequency of occurrence of hurricanes over the years within the state of 
Florida, one might correctly assume a more advanced state of preparedness to have taken 
place when compared to states that suffer disasters on a less frequent basis. Missouri is 
not one of these states as Missouri has experienced more federally declared disasters in 
recent years; yet Florida does have a more advanced formal disaster preparedness 
program than Missouri. The balance tips toward Florida as they have included much 
more detail in their plans concerning the identification of shelter facilities, shelter staffing 
and logistical support. In fairness to Missouri, one must acknowledge that Florida does 
not have the same winter weather concerns as Missouri. This comparison was made 
considering only non-catastrophic disasters as the base line. When considering 
comparable catastrophic events, Florida still struggles with preparing for the sheer 
volume of affected population, as does Missouri. The equivalent catastrophic disaster in 
Florida compared to the mid-west New Madrid seismic event in Florida is a category 4 or 
5 hurricane directly striking the Miami-Dade County area.  
The two major Florida planning documents, the state Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan and its supporting standard operating guide are in draft form with the 
Florida Catastrophic plan currently still in committee without an approved draft. This, 
along with the current level of detail related to sheltering the massive number of expected  
                                                 
17 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Executive Summary in 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 2006, S. Rep 109-322; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, “Initial Response Hot-wash, Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-
LA,” (initial response hot-wash meeting, Royal Sonesta Hotel, New Orleans, LA December 13–14, 2005). 
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evacuees from the Miami-Dade area in their plans, indicates that Florida, as well, seems 
to suffer similar challenges as many other states, including Missouri. The largest 
challenge for the state of Florida is the displacement of a majority of the 2,363,600 within 
the Miami-Dade County metropolitan area.18 This figure includes only the Miami-Dade 
County and Fort Lauderdale populations and not the surrounding area that would also be 
impacted. Still to be resolved is the question of where and how to effectively shelter a 
population of this size. In all fairness to Florida, their plans, like Missouri’s, do seem to 
provide adequate mass care to their residents during the more frequently occurring events 
such as category 1, 2 and 3 hurricanes. Their level of preparedness and response 
capabilities remain untested for a catastrophic event.19 The state of Missouri after action 
reports that proved to be the most relevant and helpful were from the two state-level New 
Madrid Earthquake exercises conducted in 2007, the after action reviews following the 
winter storms of November 30 through December 2, 2006 and the storms of January 12 
through January 22, 2007. These exercise reports provide confirmation of the 
preparedness improvements made over the past several years as well as weaknesses in the 
state’s current mass care response system.20 
The post-winter storm hot-washes are useful indicators of the struggles faced by 
the state to provide adequate sheltering to those without heat during frigid weather for a 





                                                 
18 E Podunk, “Miami-Dade County Profile,” (2004), http://www.epodunk.com/cgi-
bin/popInfo.php?locIndex=8729 (accessed November 11, 2008). 
19 Florida Emergency Management Agency, “Appendix VI” in Florida Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan (rev.), (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Emergency Management Agency, 2007); Florida 
Department of Social Services, “Final Draft., Florida Emergency Support Function #6, Standard Operating 
Guide (rev), Version 2,” (internal document, Florida Department of Social Services, Tallahassee, FL, 2008.  
20 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, After Action Report for the Missouri/New Madrid 
Earthquake Functional Exercise, June 19-21, 2007, Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, 
Jefferson City, MO: 2007; Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, After Action Report for the 
Missouri/New Madrid Earthquake Multi-Jurisdictional Tabletop Exercises, June 19-21, 2007, Missouri 
State Emergency Management Agency, Jefferson City, MO: 2007. 
 10
preparedness shortfalls that exist in coordination, logistics management and 
communications should the need be magnified to the level required by a New Madrid 
seismic event.21 
Unlike the volume of research material available in fields such as mass casualty 
preparedness, the limited amount of academic research material focused on mass care 
indicates there is a considerable need for additional research into this field of disaster 
preparedness. This work is by no means the definitive document on the subject and is 
intended solely to provide initial guidance to begin the move toward a mass care response 
capability through the building of capacity.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
The study of the mass care function of disaster response is of great consequence 
to not only those working in the field of disaster management, but also to the citizens 
served by the response community. While supporting citizens dislocated from their 
homes and neighborhoods has always presented a challenge for emergency managers, 
these challenges have become more significant in recent years due to the increase in 
population and the size and frequency of disasters forcing citizens from their homes.  
This thesis determines the strengths and weaknesses of the current mass care 
capabilities of the state of Missouri and explores the potential avenues available for 
increased capability with the goal of improving the effectiveness of the organizations 
upon which they rely almost exclusively for mass care response and recovery. Research 
of this nature contributes to the field of emergency management at all levels of 
government, but it is of particular value to the executive level by providing an 
independent and impartial analysis of the current level of mass care preparedness 
capability as well as recommended enhancements. The anticipated outcome of this 
endeavor is the development of a more proactive and consistent approach to mass care 
response within the state that includes increases in organization and system capacity that 
                                                 
21 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, Hot-wash, Missouri Winter Storm, November 30 
through December 2, 2006, Jefferson City, MO: Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, 2006; 
Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, Hot-wash, Missouri Winter Storm, January 12 through 
January 22, 2007, Jefferson City, MO: Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, 2007. 
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would greatly enhance the safety of the population. It would also increase efficiency, 
reduce dependence on federal resources and result in a model that other states facing 
similar issues will find of value.22  
D. METHOD 
In order to determine how the mass care response capabilities and response plans 
of the state of Missouri may be improved, it is necessary to first determine the current 
response capability. This will be accomplished through the review of available state 
disaster planning documents, after action reports from previous state exercises and 
disasters and the conduct of interviews with subject matter experts in mass care affiliated 
with the various key mass care response organizations within the state. 
Since the state has finite response resources, it is essential that both the federal 
and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) response capabilities be 
considered in this equation as they represent the only additional response resources for 
the state once Missouri has expended its resources. Therefore, it is important that any 
available literature, after action reports, response plans also be reviewed as well as 
interviews with key mass care subject matter experts at the regional, territorial and 
national levels. 
Review of these plans and the evaluation of past performance will determine the 
specific areas of response on which the identified agencies and organizations focus their 
effort. Also to be determined will be the estimated population that Missouri and its 
partners may effectively serve, or its mass-care response capacity. Identifying the needed 
mass care capacity will provide the basis for the comparison of need versus current 
capability, thus allowing the determination of the performance gap between the two. 
The identification of the current mass care response capacity is only of value 
when compared to the expected catastrophic threat. In this case, the mass care needs are 
dictated by a catastrophic seismic event along the New Madrid Seismic Zone. This 
comparison is made with the projected damage estimates available within the Federal 
                                                 
22 Discussed in Chapter IV, subsections C and F. 
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Emergency Management Agency earthquake damage predictive modeling tool called 
HAZUS.23 This tool provides a baseline damage estimate that includes the number of 
buildings damaged or destroyed, their various level of damage and the estimated number 
of displaced persons within the impacted area. While these numbers represent only one 
incidence of an earthquake and do not include any additional aftershock data, they do 
provide a baseline from which reasonably accurate estimates may be formed. These 
estimates represent the number of Missouri citizens who may require mass care support 
from the state and its partners. 
The next step in the process is to determine the steps necessary to develop the 
additional mass care response capacity to bridge the gap between the current and desired 
level of response. This is done by analyzing the current plans and policies supporting 
ESF-6 seeking opportunities to increase organizational efficiency, identify new methods 
and developing potential previously untapped resources. 
The final step is the identification of any increase in cost related to the increase in 
response capacity. The desired outcome is the efficient use of the available funding while 
gaining an increase in capability. This will be accomplished through the review of 
previous financial expenditures for mass care response development and assigning 
monetary value against any proposed initiative. 
The desired outcome of this research is the development of policy 
recommendations resulting in more capable response operations. This will be 
accomplished by more clearly defining organizational roles, providing additional ESF-6 
capacity through an increase in organizational coordination and strengthening of the 
disaster planning process. These policies must be accomplished while minimizing any 
projected fiscal impact.24 
                                                 
23 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “HAZUS-MH: Earthquake Event Report, Region Name: 
New Madrid Region-NEnewLQ, Earthquake Scenario: New Madrid Northeast-M7.7,” (internal document, 
database hazard prediction tool,  Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 7, Kansas City, MO, 
2005). 
24 Specifics are discussed in Chapter IV, Preparedness Recommendations with particular emphasis on 
subsections C and D.  
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II. CURRENT RISKS AND VULNERABILTIES–DEFINING THE 
CHALLENGE 
This section provides an overview of the scope of the threat posed to Missouri by 
the New Madrid Seismic Zone through a comparison of its historical impact and the 
expected impact of similar events should they occur in twenty-first century. Of specific 
interest is the comparison of the numbers of expected injured and displaced persons and 
the levels of infrastructure damage.  
A. NEW MADRID SEISMIC ZONE HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
The greatest natural disaster of concern for government at all levels within the 
state of Missouri is an earthquake along the New Madrid Seismic Zone. This fault zone is 
considered the highest risk in the mainland United States outside of the San Andreas 
Fault Zone on the West Coast. While this fault does not cause frequent damaging 
tremors, the underlying geology would cause destruction over an area 20 times the area 
of a West Coast quake. The primary discussions focus on how soon it will occur and the 
resulting level of damage.25 Included in Figure 1 is a map of the area of impact of the 
1895 earthquake estimated to be 6.8 on the Richter scale centered on Charleston, 
Missouri.26 This map is indicative of the large geographical area under threat from the 
New Madrid Fault Zone. 
                                                 
25 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “Missouri SEMA Earthquake Program,” 
http://sema.dps.mo.gov/EQ.htm (accessed January 28, 2007). 
26 Illinois State Geological Survey, “1895 Halloween Earthquake,” Earthquake Facts 1995-1, Illinois 
State Geological Survey, (1995), http://www.isgs.uiuc.edu/research/earthquake-hazards/pdf-files/eq-fct-
hal.pdf (accessed March 9, 2008). 
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Figure 1.   Regional Earthquake Impact Comparison 
Figure 1 shows the impact area comparison of the 1895 Charelston, Missouri 
earthquake on the New Madrid Fault and the 1994 Northridge, California earthquake. 
Although earthquakes in the central and eastern United States are less frequent than in the 
western United States, they affect much larger areas. This is shown by two areas affected 
by earthquakes of similar magnitude-the 1895 Charleston, Missouri, earthquake in the 
New Madrid seismic zone and the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake. Red indicates 
minor to major damage to buildings and their contents. Yellow indicates shaking felt, but 
little or no damage to objects, such as dishes.27 
The intent of this thesis is to examine the current level of preparedness related to 
mass care response for an earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone and not delve 
deeply in the arena of earthquake and geological science. Most experts agree that the 
three largest of the series of earthquakes that make up the 1811–1812 events were 
between 7.5 and 8.0 on the Richter scale. It is believed that more than 2,000 actual events 
occurred during this time period.  
In the winter of 1811 and 1812, the Mississippi Valley was struck by three of the 
most powerful earthquakes in the history of the United States. These earthquakes 
centered near the town of New Madrid in southeast Missouri and devastated the 
                                                 
27 Eugene Schweig, Joan Gomberg, and James W. Hendley II, “The Mississippi Valley: ‘Whole Lotta 
Shakin’ Going On,” United States Geological Survey, http://quake.usgs.gov/prepare/factsheets/NewMadrid 
(accessed March 4, 2008). 
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surrounding region, ringing church bells as far away as Boston, Massachusetts. These 
great earthquakes altered the regional landscape, changing the course of the Mississippi 
River and creating the over 10-square-mile Reelfoot Lake in northwestern Tennessee.28 
Strong scientific evidence exists that strong earthquakes in the Central Mississippi 
Valley have occurred repeatedly in the past. Small earthquakes occur in the region 
frequently. This fault zone crosses five state lines, cuts across the Mississippi River in 
three places and the Ohio River in two places. This fault averages 200 measured events a 
year. Most of these, approximately 20 per month are below 2.5 on the Richter scale and 
may not be felt by most people. Tremors large enough to be felt, between 2.5 and 3.0R 
are reported annually. Every 18 months a shock of 4.0R, or one large enough to cause 
local damage occurs. Events with a magnitude of 5.0R or greater occur once per decade 
and may be felt in several states, and a 6.0R or greater occurs every 80 years; the last of 
these occurred in 1895. There is now an estimated probability of 25–40 percent that a 
6.0R or greater earthquake occurring within the next 50 years.29 The majority of experts 
are in agreement that it is not a matter of if, but a matter of when a significant seismic 
event will occur along the New Madrid fault line. 
B. SIGNIFICANT VULNERABILITY SHIFT SINCE 1811/1812 
The population of the Mississippi Valley in 1811 and 1812 was sparse with few 
man-made structures and surely no structures that would rival what exists today with 
modern construction. The road network consisted of horse and wagon trails, and most 
rivers were forded or crossed via ferry. This area is now home to millions of people 
living and working in man-made structures of questionable seismic durability in cities 
such as St. Louis, Missouri and Memphis, Tennessee.  
Even the rural areas of the affected states have been developed with significant 
populations working and living in multiple-level structures, many of which were 
constructed in the soft alluvial soil of the area which is known to actually magnify the 
                                                 
28 Thomas G. Hildenbrand, Victoria E. Langenheim, Eugene Schweig, Peter Stauffer, and James 
Hendley II. “Uncovering Hidden Hazards.” 
29 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “Missouri SEMA.” 
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shock wave of an earthquake. Missouri has no state level seismic building code, so it falls 
to the local jurisdictions and counties to address this issue. Though most recognize that a 
large scale New Madrid seismic event may occur in the near future, relatively few of the 
communities or counties have adopted serious seismic construction building codes.  
An earthquake or series of earthquakes like those of 1811–1812 striking the 
Mississippi Valley today would devastate the population of the area. The author has 
included a copy of the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale map in Figures 2 and 3 below. 
This map is widely used seismic event planning tool. It indicates the predicted intensity 
of a New Madrid seismic event and expected damage levels. 
An earthquake or series of earthquakes like those of 1811–1812 striking the 
Mississippi Valley today would devastate the population of the area. The author has 
included a copy of the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale map in Figures 2 and 3 below. 
This map is widely used seismic event planning tool. It indicates the predicted intensity 
of a New Madrid seismic event and expected damage levels. 
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Figure 2.   Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale Map 
 18
 
Figure 3.   Modified Mercalli Intensity Map Legend 
1. Injured and Displaced Persons 
Numbers and extent of injuries suffered by those in the affected areas vary based 
on the time of day of the event. Injuries are categorized in four levels; level one consists 
of injuries that require medical attention without hospitalization, level two injuries  
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require hospitalization but are not considered life threatening, level three injuries also 
require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated and level 
four victims are killed by the earthquake.  
The Hazards United States-Multi-Hazards (HAZUS) predictive model report 
indicates that out of a regional population of 10,917,309 people, 205,637 households will 
be displaced.30 Of these, 57,437 people will seek temporary shelter in public shelters.31 
One must keep in mind that these numbers are merely the result of the HAZUS 
computer predictive model, and while it is considered by many to be helpful, it is not 
considered perfect. It is generally considered by most experts to be the best tool currently 
available. There are many variables involved in the prediction of earthquake impact on 
population. In the case of the New Madrid fault zone and its history, the most significant 
variable is the repetition of major shocks that are often too large to be considered 
aftershocks. Repetitive shocks are expected to produce cumulative structural damage 
rendering structures previously deemed habitable as unsafe. It is these repetitive shocks 
that are expected to increase the number of injuries, fatalities and displaced citizens. As 
these shocks continue, the number of people seeking public shelter is expected to rise. 
The HAZUS tool does not project losses from cascading events following an earthquake, 
such as fires, flooding and hazardous materials incidents. 
2. Infrastructure Damage 
Adding to the complication of providing adequate public temporary shelters is the 
destruction of a significant portion of the public infrastructure. Adequate sheltering is 
determined not only by the shelters themselves but also by the ability to conduct mass 
feeding operations and the operations of the bulk distribution networks necessary to 
support the subsistence of the affected population. In order to accomplish this, it is 
necessary to recognize and overcome the amount of infrastructure damage that is 
expected as the result of a seismic event of this scale. 
                                                 
30 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “HAZUS-MH: Earthquake Event Report,” 3, 13. 
31 Ibid., 13. 
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According to the available HAZUS data, the ability to deliver resources through 
the traditional transportation networks will be severely challenged. The model predicts 
30,314 highway bridges and 10,325 segments of highway to be negatively impacted.32 
The railroad infrastructure will also suffer with an impact on 425 railway bridges, 393 
railroad facilities and 8,885 segments of railroad.33 Rerouting critical supplies through 
the air is a continuous challenge for response personnel as there are limitations on the 
amount of material that may be moved by air. HAZUS data predicts a negative impact of 
a quake of this magnitude on 637 airport facilities and 720 runways, and even further 
restricting this capability.34 
Also of great importance to sheltering and feeding this large number of people is 
the need for water, natural gas, electrical power and communication systems to support 
the shelters and feeding networks. The HAZUS model predicts an impact on the 
capabilities of 249 potable water facilities, 1,646 waste-water facilities, 114 natural gas 
facilities, 158 electrical power facilities and 940 communications facilities.35 
Given the severe damage anticipated, the state of Missouri has identified two 
ground transportation routes from the center of the state to the predicted affected area on 
the eastern side of the state. One route will move material northeast toward St. Louis and 
the other will go southeast toward New Madrid and Cape Girardeau. These are the only 
two routes that can be reasonably expected to support any movement of materials into the 
affected area; however, they may require some repair prior to facilitating this movement. 
Given the expected transportation challenge for the movement of bulk distribution, it 
seems that individual and family preparedness initiatives prior to the event are critical for 
increasing the survival rate of citizens while these transportation issues are resolved. 
The entire CUSEC region is under threat by an earthquake of this magnitude. The 
level of predicted damage is expected to dwarf current capability to effectively respond 
based on current response plans. The only disaster within the United States generally 
                                                 
32 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “HAZUS-MH: Earthquake Event Report,” 5. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 6. 
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recognized as establishing a precedent for catastrophic events is Hurricane Katrina in 
2005. While tragic, the level of destruction experienced in Hurricane Katrina does not 
approach the predicted level of geographic devastation expected in a New Madrid seismic 
event.  
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III. EXISTING RESPONSE CAPABILTIES 
To form a picture of the current capability, the following section examines the 
current strengths and weaknesses of the various governmental and non-governmental 
organizations involved in mass care response activities within the state of Missouri. This 
section is organized by levels of government and the various volunteer organizations that 
have been determined to be the key participants in the mass care preparedness and 
response system. The focus is on identifying the strengths and weaknesses of these 
organizations seeking areas that present opportunities to enhance mass care response. 
Figure 4 below outlines the disaster response structure for ESF-6 at the state level as it is 
currently defined.  
 
Figure 4.   Current State Mass Care Management Structure 
State Unified Command 
Operations Section 
Human Services Branch 
ESF-6 Mass Care 
Department of Social Service 
American Red Cross 
Salvation Army 
Southern Baptist 
76 Other Volunteer 
organizations
Private Sector 
Current State Mass Care Management Structure 
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A. STATUS OF CURRENT MISSOURI GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS 
Due to the recent impact of several weather related disasters within the state of 
Missouri, there has been improvement in the overall mass care response capability 
through repeated response. This has been ad-hoc and reactive, not part of an overall 
deliberate planning and preparedness effort. While the state had positive results, this 
improved capability does not approach the response levels necessary for a catastrophic 
disaster.36 
The Missouri State Emergency Operations Plan (SEOP), dated October 2006, is 
similar to the federal plan. It has an all-hazards format designed with the flexibility 
necessary to address the various hazards or threats that may be encountered within the 
state. The challenge encountered when writing all-hazards plans is the need to include 
sufficient detail to be effective while allowing enough flexibility to address the various 
expected hazards. To address this challenge in the SEOP, the state of Missouri published 
Annex Y in October 2006. Annex Y is a hazard-specific annex providing more detailed 
planning guidance to address the New Madrid earthquake threat. The SEOP designates 
the Department of Social Services (DSS) as the lead state agency responsible for the 
ESF-6 function. As with the NRF and FEMA, the state and DSS rely on the ARC and 
other Volunteer Agencies (VOLAGs) for the execution and coordination of sheltering, 
feeding and bulk distribution mission during times of disaster. 37  
The SEOP Base Plan contains six lines addressing the mass care function, 
assigning specific preparedness responsibilities to the Department of Social Services.38 
The responsibilities specifically cited include: the identification of suitable facilities for 
feeding and lodging for both the civilian population and institutionalized groups under 
state control, the establishment of test or exercise procedures for mass care, the 
                                                 
36 Dante Gliniecki (Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, State Volunteer Coordinator), 
interview by author, February 15, 2008. 
37 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Operations Plan (rev.), (Jefferson 
City, MO: Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, 2006). 
38Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “Attachment B, Appendix 3” in Missouri State 
Emergency Operation Plan (rev.), (Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, Jefferson City, MO: 
2003).  
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establishment of liaisons with outside organizations such as the Red Cross and the 
Salvation Army, coordination of their work on the SEOP and assistance in the planning 
for food and water availability. 
Annex I of the SEOP contains more detail concerning specific preparedness 
functions such as the identification and selection of available shelter locations, inventory 
of equipment and supplies, preparation of distribution networks for food and water, the 
identification of responsible agencies for specific response activities and the formulation 
and review of plans and standard operating guidelines (SOG) for state support to local 
mass care operations. While these functions are identified and assigned, they are 
identified strictly on the macro-planning level and lack sufficient detail to allow for a 
planned response, such as the identification of a target capability for the population to be 
sheltered. The challenge is to further develop the plan through the addition of supporting 
standard operating guidelines written in sufficient detail to provide the guidance 
necessary to successfully accomplish all of the tasks to provide the public with support 
during time of disaster. The tasks of primary concern are shelters, bulk distribution of 
food, water and critical supplies and mass feeding stations. The author was unable to 
locate any official SOGs at the state level with this sufficient level of detail. These tasks 
are carried out by the membership of the Missouri Volunteer Organizations Active in 
Disaster (MOVOAD) consisting of 79 separate volunteer organizations. DSS is expected 
to manage this through a flat organizational structure through which all of these 
organizations report directly to DSS. 
The state-developed Annex Y of the SEOP as a threat specific plan to address the 
threat posed by the New Madrid Seismic Zone with Appendix 5 to Annex Y targeting the 
mass care function. The current version of this document is intended to address the 
operation of Red Cross shelters both inside and outside of the affected area. Shelters 
inside the affected area are intended to provide immediate shelter for those who have lost 
their homes either through total destruction or were deemed unsafe for occupancy. 




shelters. Shelters located within the state outside the affected area tend to receive 
evacuees from within the affected area that are left without family or friends that might 
be able to assist them.  
The addition of the “stand alone” or threat specific plan in the form of Annex Y 
located within the “all-hazards” planning model through which the state SEOP was 
originally designed is counterintuitive and may lead to confusion by personnel 
accustomed to either the individual threat planning model or the all-hazards planning 
model The current level of detail in the SEOP coupled with the lack of supporting SOGs 
results in a plan that does not provide adequate guidance for a mass care response to a 
catastrophic disaster. 
One area of concern identified by Dante Gliniecki was the lack of full time 
preparedness personnel assigned to the state-level Emergency Support Functions 
(ESFs).39 It is up to the individual agencies assigned with primary responsibility for each 
of these ESFs to develop SOGs and ensure the proper level of preparedness and 
coordination with their assigned support agencies. Only two ESFs were identified for 
which full-time state personnel were assigned.40 The balance of the ESFs were assigned 
one or two part-time personnel who are expected to accomplish all aspects of mitigation, 
preparation, response and recovery operations related to the assigned ESFs. In Missouri, 
ESF-6 has only two mid-level managers and one employee assigned emergency 
management responsibilities from the Department of Social Services as a portion of their 
responsibility on a part-time basis. These personnel have a considerable number of other 
responsibilities that undoubtedly distract them from their roles in ESF-6.  
This lack of task-dedicated personnel is a long-standing challenge faced by 
emergency management as a whole and is not isolated to ESF-6. When elected and 
appointed officials are faced with the decision of allocating resources between current 
existing daily challenges or future hypothetical challenges that may occur, such as 
disasters, they usually allocate the available resources to the existing daily challenges. 
                                                 
39 Gliniecki, interview, 2006. 
40 ESF 5 Emergency Management and ESF 8 Health Care were the only two ESFs identified with 
sufficient staff to effectively plan and prepare for their roles in a disaster. 
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This places a significant burden on too few personnel to adequately address the 
challenges of preparing for disasters. It is unlikely that the Department of Social Services 
can reasonably expect two, part-time mid-level managers and one entry-level employee 
to successfully accomplish all tasks related to mass care preparedness and response for a 
potential disaster sheltering requirement of tens of thousands of citizens within 47 
counties.  
The state of Missouri does not currently have specified strategic goals or target 
capacity in its mass care program. This lack of strategic guidance, in conjunction with the 
simultaneous employment of two planning modalities within the state emergency 
operations plan, both of which are incomplete, contributes to inadequate guidance and 
confusion in the preparedness and response efforts. The other concern of the author is the 
insufficient number of state departmental personnel and fiscal resources dedicated to 
preparing the individual state agencies for catastrophic disaster response. 
B. STATUS OF CURRENT MISSOURI NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
PROGRAMS 
Missouri’s non-governmental partners are a mixture of volunteer organizations 
that range from those with significant disaster response experience that are relatively 
organized to those that are inexperienced and purely reactive in nature. The challenge is 
to effectively coordinate the efforts of these organizations to maximize the efficiency of 
their services to the public while minimizing redundancy in this service. It is from this 
perspective that one begins with the management of volunteer disaster preparedness at 
the state level with the Governor’s Disaster Recovery Partnership. 
1. Governor’s Disaster Recovery Partnership  
The formal organization not named in the SEOP is the Governor’s Disaster 
Recovery Partnership. The partnership is a governmental entity and non-governmental 
cooperative workgroup. It is the primary means for the state to interact with organizations 
involved in mass care disaster management and recovery as the partnership includes 
government at the federal, state and local level as well as not-for-profit, voluntary 
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organizations and other organizations such as community action programs. Given the 
mission tasked in the Governor’s Executive Order creating this organization, it is unclear 
as to why it is not mentioned in the formal SEOP. 
The Disaster Recovery Partnership was created by an Executive Order after the 
Great Flood of 1993 to improve the coordination of response to the overwhelming human 
needs caused by that event. The Partnership was reaffirmed by Executive Order 03–23 in 
December 2003. As charged in the Executive Order, the Partnership’s responsibilities 
are:  
 Reviewing and implementing, as appropriate, the recommendations of the 
original Disaster Recovery Partnership;  
 Reviewing the human services disaster response and recovery delivery 
methods with a goal of improving service to the citizens of Missouri;  
 Designing methods of more rapid collection and analysis of data on 
disaster victims and their needs;  
 Developing a simplified intake system linked to centralized databanks to 
improve human services response and recovery services;  
 Establishing more rapid and complete communications to disaster victims 
and caregivers during emergency response and recovery stages;  
 Promoting, training and supporting local committees, similar to the local 
unmet needs committees formed during the flood of 1993, with additional 
attention to the establishment and representation of community Citizen 
Councils; and  
 Functioning as a statewide Citizen Council for the state of Missouri, with 
support to the Homeland Security Council on post-disaster human service 
issues. 41  
The role of the Governor’s Disaster Recovery Partnership should be expanded to 
provide more strategic guidance for the development of the mass care preparedness and  
 
                                                 
41 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “Government, Faith-Based and Community 
Partnership,” http://sema.dps.mo.gov/CC%20Webs/CCstatecouncil.asp (accessed July 25, 2007); Missouri 
Secretary of State, “Governor’s Executive Orders, Executive Order 03-23,”(2003) 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2003/eo03_023.asp (accessed November 11, 2008). 
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response functions in catastrophic events. The implementation of this guidance should be 
a coordinated effort between the Department of Social Services and the Missouri 
Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster. 
2. Missouri Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster 
The non-governmental volunteer agencies mentioned in the state plan are grouped 
together under the Missouri Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (MOVOAD). 
The plan contains a short overview of the MOVOAD, and lists six of the key disaster 
players.42 Out of the six organizations listed in Annex I (Mass Care), Appendix 1 
(MOVOAD), only the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army (TSA) have any 
responsibilities mentioned within the annex. The Red Cross is charged with the provision 
of food, clothing, shelter, crisis counseling, welfare inquiries, the training and 
coordination of volunteers and other services as needed. The Salvation Army is charged 
with mass feeding, sheltering, spiritual counseling and other mass care needs.  
The MOVOAD is represented in the partnership providing volunteer 
organizations a voice in the establishment of policy relevant to the mass care function. 
The MOVOAD is an organization that allows all volunteer organizations43 to have an 
association to address their own issues.44 Representatives of state government, such as 
the Department of Social Services, are welcome to attend the MoVOAD meetings as ex-
officio members. This is important to DSS as coordination and planning with the 
MoVOAD membership has a direct impact on their success in providing mass care 
during times of disaster. 
Member organizations of the MOVOAD with the most significant role in disaster 
response and recovery, such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist 
Convention, occupy seats within ESF 6 in the State Emergency Operation Center and 
                                                 
42 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “Annex I, Appendix 1” in Missouri State 
Emergency Operations Plan (Jefferson City, MO: Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, 2006). 
43 The MOVOAD not only includes the Salvation Army, American Red Cross and Southern Baptist 
Convention, but also all of the major faith-based groups and some private sector not for profit 
organizations. 
44 Gliniecki, interview, 2006. 
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assist DSS in the coordination of mass care. They include the other MOVOAD member 
organizations during times of disaster. At the community and or county level within the 
state, the Community Organizations Active in Disaster (COADs) serves as a local version 
of the MOVOADs. Their membership is similar to the MOVOADs, but they may include 
local government and private sector partners. There are approximately 25 COADs in 
operation within the state.45 
Mass care disaster response is currently managed in an ad-hoc manner with the 
ARC and other officially recognized local organizations responsible for sheltering 
opening a few pre-designated shelter locations within impacted areas. Other local 
volunteer organizations such as churches soon follow with additional shelters. 
Unfortunately as is often the case, the local and state emergency management 
organizations are not aware of these additional shelters. As the local volunteer 
organizations strain to sustain the logistical support for their operations, they are forced to 
turn to the local and state government for resources, often with incredibly short delivery 
timelines. Failure to meet these timelines may result in shelters without necessities such 
as food, water, blankets or heat.  
The second major challenge created by the well-meaning charitable organizations 
with their emergent shelters is that the majority of the personnel managing these shelters 
are not adequately trained to meet the Red Cross and Salvation Army shelter 
guidelines.46 At this time the only organization conducting staff training for disaster 
shelter operations within Missouri is the ARC, which conducts classes at a rate of five per 
year. This training rate is marginal, at best, for sustaining the current number of qualified 
shelter volunteers and insufficient for increasing shelter capacity.47 This decreases the 
chance for success and can result in forcing the ARC to assume responsibility for the  
 
                                                 
45 Missouri Disaster Recovery Partnership, State of Missouri Community Organizations Active in 
Disaster (COAD) Guidance Manual (rev.), (2002) http://sema.dps.mo.gov/COAD.pdf (accessed August 1, 
2007). 
46 The American Red Cross Shelter Guidelines are considered the minimum acceptable standers for 
the operation of disaster shelters within the state of Missouri. 
47 Melissa Friel, Missouri State Capital Region Director and State Coordinator for the American Red 
Cross, Interview by author, February 22, 2007. 
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operation of these troubled shelters, which contributes to system inefficiency, deficient 
quality control and duplication of effort within the sheltering and bulk distribution 
systems. 
3. American Red Cross 
For many years, the American Red Cross (ARC) has been the organization that 
formed the cornerstone of the mass care response and recovery effort within the state of 
Missouri. Ms. Melissa Friel is the ARC Disaster Liaison for the state of Missouri, as well 
as the Capital Area Chapter Executive Director. During her interview, Ms. Friel cited the 
emergency management maxim, “All disasters begin and end at the local level.”48 It is 
with this philosophy that the ARC has established its business model with the majority of 
its focus at the chapter or local level. 
Chapters are responsible for managing mass care functions at the local level for 
the first three to five days of the event. Chapters open and manage shelters, provide fixed 
and mobile feeding stations, ice, water and immediate family assistance that may also 
include clothing, blankets, medications or other necessities. The chapter notifies the ARC 
“service area” of the event, and the service area offers additional support in the form of 
personnel and logistics as needed.49 If the chapter is able to provide sufficient ESF 6 
resources to effectively meet the needs of the affected community, leadership and 
management of the event remains at the chapter level. 
When the local needs exceed one or more chapters’ support capabilities, the 
service area provides additional personnel, logistical and management support. The 
service area in effect becomes the regional resource structure for ARC activities in the 
affected area. The service area operation takes time to establish and begins with the call-
up of available resources within the service area itself. If the operational needs of the Red 
Cross exceed the capability of the chapter to meet those needs even with service area 
support, National American Red Cross will establish a disaster relief operation under its 
                                                 
48 Friel, interview. 
49 The ARC service areas are regional bodies made up of several states and may act as a regional 
management and resource structure. The service area that includes Missouri consists of seven states. 
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direction and control. These disaster relief operations are called DROs. These DROs meet 
the needs of the relief operation during peak activity and eventually phase the operation 
back to chapter management. 
Since the main strength of the ARC resides within the chapters and service areas, 
it is of some concern that within the last few years the state of Missouri has observed the 
number of Red Cross Chapters reduced from 125 to 13. The ARC seems comfortable 
with this reduction in the number of chapters and views the change as a move toward a 
formal regional structure within the state, establishing the ARC units as regional chapters. 
From the ARC perspective, this concept facilitates a more even distribution of resources 
throughout the state as the preparedness, response and recovery effort for each region are 
coordinated by each regional chapter. In previous years, assistance was hindered by the 
amount of money and resources available to each chapter. The more affluent urban 
chapters were in a much better position to support their constituents than the chapters in 
the more rural areas of the state.50 
After the 2004 hurricane season, the ARC recognized the need for more detailed, 
stronger agreements with other organizations that may assist in disaster response. These 
agreements are in the form of memorandums of understanding (MOU) existing not only 
with the Salvation Army and Southern Baptist Convention but with hundreds of other 
organizations such as the Girl Scouts, NAACP, Urban League and the Boy Scouts. This 
recognition for the need for formal alliances is to be commended as it promotes 
coordinated disaster planning and preparedness. 
The ARC has adopted a formal partnership strategy outlining a new responsibility 
to be a convener and supporter of other organizations as well as maintain its role as a 
provider of direct service provision.51 As part of this formal strategy the ARC has more 
clearly defined what constitutes a shelter. When asked, Ms. Melissa Friel of the ARC 
outlined the various levels of shelters as follows: 
                                                 
50 Friel, interview. 
51 “Connection Preparedness and Response,” ARC Newsletter, No. 2006-012, (2006). 
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The Red Cross started to realize that disaster response needed to focus on 
better results for disaster victims, rather than rigid and procedure driven 
systems. This evolution started occurring in 2004, driven home again after 
Hurricane Katrina. Experienced shelter organizations such as the ARC and 
The Salvation Army (TSA) had not yet developed sufficient flexibility to 
effectively address spontaneous shelters run by less experienced volunteer 
organizations. In light of the lack of flexibility these organizations are now 
evolving even further for example; there are now four definitions of Red 
Cross shelters.   
The first is a pure Red Cross shelter, opened, managed and supported by 
the Red Cross.   
The second is a partner shelter. The partner agency and or organization 
(for example, a church) will open and run their own shelter.  The Red 
Cross will support this shelter 100 percent. They provide the cots, 
blankets, food, etc., based on the requests of the partner agency. If the 
partner agency shelter is damaged, the Red Cross pays for repairs. The 
Red Cross also reimburses the partner shelter for expenses incurred 
through running the shelter. This type of shelter requires a shelter 
agreement signed by the partner agency and the Red Cross, which also 
provides the partner agency with shelter operation training.   
The third type of shelter is a community shelter where the partner 
organization assumes all responsibility for the shelter and the Red Cross 
might provide food or material resources.  
The final type of shelter is one not supported by the Red Cross. This is a 
shelter that only allows its members to be in the shelter, for example a 
church that allows only its parishioners in and keeps those in need out of 
the shelter. This is in direct opposition to the fundamental principles of the 
Red Cross, so the Red Cross would not provide any support to this type of 
shelter.52 
The Missouri Capital Area Chapter, as an example, is responsible for 20 counties 
and currently has approximately 225 volunteers supported by seven full-time ARC staff 
members. Approximately 97 percent of ARC personnel are volunteers.53 There are 
several counties that are supported by ARC teams from outside their chartered counties. 
                                                 
52 Friel, interview. 
53 Ibid. 
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This equates to approximately 11 volunteers per county in one of the stronger ARC 
chapters in the state. These figures are based on all of the ARC volunteers and staff being 
available for disaster response. For planning purposes the ARC assumes that only 35 
percent of their volunteer staff and 50 percent of their leadership will be available for any 
given disaster response.54 This figure declines the longer a disaster continues. This 
translates to a maximum of 129 chapter personnel available within the chapter with six 
personnel available for each county within the chapter. These percentages are based on 
Missouri disaster response to date. It is difficult to accurately estimate the impact a 
catastrophic event on the scale of a New Madrid seismic event on the ARC’s personnel.55 
With a current ARC initiative establishing the goal of each chapter to adequately 
shelter 10 percent of their resident population; it is evident that the previously discussed 
inter-voluntary agency agreements are critical to the success of the ARC and ESF-6 
response. In the event of a New Madrid type of catastrophic event, the ARC’s capability 
would be severely challenged, as was the case in the Hurricane Katrina response.56 In 
response to a need identified as a result of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA and the ARC are 
currently building a national shelter database identifying the location of the local facilities 
currently identified as shelters. The development of the ARC National Shelter System 
(NSS) database is a significant step in preparing for another catastrophic event, but the 
results are limited as the database only contains ARC Type 1 shelters, leaving the issue of 
supporting shelters managed by the other volunteer organizations outside of the system 
still in question. Other mass care facilities, such as feeding kitchens, feeding sites and 
bulk distribution sites are not currently included in the database. 
The pre-disaster identification of shelters will assist with organizing the bulk 
distribution of supplies for these shelters. The distribution of supplies, mobile and fixed 
feeding sites and other ESF logistical needs are still dependent upon the establishment of 
points of distribution (PODS) as the disaster unfolds. This approach is better suited for  
 
                                                 




the typical Missouri riverine flooding and disasters that develop slowly or are forecasted. 
Catastrophic events that occur without warning create a certain level of chaos that 
inhibits an ad-hoc approach to resource delivery.  
A bulk distribution plan for each region, county and local jurisdiction would 
provide a baseline organizational structure from which deviation could be made as 
needed in a more efficient and organized manner. Effective planning templates for bulk 
distribution have been developed by the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE). There are three 
levels of PODs with floor plans for each level. The staffing of these PODS is currently 
NOT assigned to any agency, public or private, at any jurisdictional level. Conversations 
are underway between the State Emergency Management Agency and the Southern 
Baptist and between SEMA and the Convoy of Hope to address the staffing needs of 
PODS. Even though the ACE-PODs program holds promise for improved resource 
distribution at the local level, significant work remains in the development of the 
logistical movement plan that supports the movement of state and federal supplies across 
the state to these PODs. 
The ARC is arguably one of the strongest partners of the state when it comes to 
the provision of sheltering and feeding support during time of disaster. It has the most 
aggressive formal training and preparedness programs and evacuee and shelter tracking 
systems identified. Of concern is the decline in paid and volunteer staffing forcing it to 
restructure, the limited number of annual shelter management training courses it can 
conduct as well as the incomplete status of its evacuee tracking system. The ARC should 
be given overall responsibility for sheltering operations under the supervision of the 
Department of Social Services. This responsibility would include guiding all of the other 
volunteer organizations that have chosen sheltering as their contribution to the disaster 
response. 
4. Salvation Army 
The primary ESF-6 mission of the Salvation Army (TSA) within the state of 
Missouri is the provision of both fixed and mobile mass feeding facilities. TSA responds 
to disasters using the National Incident Management System with a “bottom up” 
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approach to disaster management. Like the ARC, TSA considers disasters to be local 
events and are managed from a TSA Command Center at the division level. TSA 
operates two divisions within the state of Missouri. The Kansas and Western Missouri 
Division incorporates several counties in western Missouri including the Kansas City 
area, and the Midland Division based in St. Louis that includes the balance of the state. 
The local TSA resources initially respond within the local jurisdiction with the 
division joining the response once the locals determine the need for more resources than 
the locals can provide. The division assumes command and control of the TSA 
operations, drawing upon the divisional resources until it is determined that they will 
prove insufficient. Resources requests are then made to TSA national headquarters and 
national coordinated resource deployment from the other division around the nation. 
These national resources are operationally controlled at the division level in the affected 
area.57 
Recognizing the need for unity of effort and positive control of resources, the 
TSA Division deploys liaison staff to both the emergency operations centers at the local 
and state levels. As in the case of the ARC, TSA is a core member of the local planning 
effort, any applicable COADs and the state MOVOAD. 
Due to the organization’s experience in dealing with shelter operations for the 
homeless on a daily basis, TSA is capable of establishing and operating a limited number 
of emergency shelters. Due to the depth of its involvement in the resource intensive 
operations of mass feeding and bulk distribution, it views its capability as limited and it is 
occasionally used to supplement the ARC shelters if needed. A recent positive 
development is TSA’s adoption of the ARC Shelter Management Course and Shelter 
Simulation courses as the standard for its sheltering services. 
As stated earlier, TSA’s mass feeding capability is a critical life saving tool in the 
state’s disaster response tool box. In the case of a New Madrid event, it is imperative that 
mass feeding operation be established as soon as possible as the expected wide-ranging 
                                                 
57 Dee Smith (Salvation Army, Kansas and Western Missouri Division, Director of Emergency 
Disaster Services), interview by author, January 10, 2007. 
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power outages and number of lost and uninhabitable structures will make obtaining 
potable water and food difficult at best. While the state will undoubtedly encourage those 
without habitable homes to evacuate the area, it is likely that a significant number of 
victims will resist choosing to stay in the area. This will place additional pressure on the 
mass care function. Of particular concern are the more urban areas where open cooking 
fires and camping can cause additional fire hazards and sanitation concerns. 
TSA has considerable experience in responding to large-scale disasters including 
the Midwest Flood of 1993 and Hurricane Katrina. Its formal planning processes, level of 
preparedness, and dedicated staff are an effective combination. Developing and 
maintaining an adequate response capability for a New Madrid event is simply beyond 
the resources of any single organization. Like the ARC, TSA is an effective partner and 
as such brings an organized preparedness system and trained responders to the overall 
disaster preparedness process. These partner’s capabilities and processes should be 
included in future ESF-6 development, built upon and expanded.  
The Kansas and Western Missouri Division has the maximum capability to 
produce 42,500 meals per day. This is based on the assumption that another division 
would assume the daily duties of those personnel and equipment within the Kansas City 
Metropolitan area, as no reserve would be left behind.58 Assuming that the Midland 
Division has a similar capacity and its resources are still available at a 100 percent 
capability following the New Madrid event (this may be a stretch), this is only a 
maximum capability of 85,000 meals per day or enough for 28,334 victims statewide. It 
is questionable if this number is sufficient to feed even those requiring service in the St. 
Louis area. This is where the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) and its mass feeding 
capability are required. Beyond a base mass feeding capability, formal detailed 
agreements are necessary when merging the capabilities of two or more organization of 
this size. Kevin Ellers, a Territorial Disaster Coordinator with TSA indicates that TSA 
recognizes the need for detailed, formal agreements between disaster response volunteer 
organizations.  
                                                 
58 Smith, interview, 2007. 
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Most of our MOUs with other volunteer organizations are general in 
nature without the inclusion of specific responsibilities or agreements. The 
most specific one is the MOU we have with the Southern Baptist, because 
they prepare the food for us and we distribute it, which is pretty detailed.59 
This ARC and the SBC MOU is actually one of the most detailed collaborative 
volunteer organization type MOUs in existence.60 This MOU spells out in great detail the 
process for cooperation in several areas (i.e., mass feeding, disaster and child care) and 
covers detailed methods of cooperation that include reimbursement for food and other 
costs. TSA and SBC use the same basic SBC/ARC MOU as the foundation for their own 
MOU. These agreements are considered “best practices” and are encouraged as models 
for other volunteer organizations. 
The TSA ‘s strength lies in its ability to provide large-scale feeding operations, 
support these operations through its bulk distribution network and effectively partner 
with other organizations. TSA should be given overall responsibility for mass feeding 
operations under the supervision of the Department of Social Services. This responsibility 
would include guiding all of the other volunteer organizations that have chosen mass 
feeding as their contribution to the disaster response. 
5. Southern Baptist Convention 
The Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) role within ESF-6 is the provision of 
primarily fixed mass feeding sites in support of the Salvation Army and American Red 
Cross. The SBC defines its primary mass care mission as feeding people and the 
distribution of food products throughout the nation and internationally. The SBC is a 
highly motivated and dedicated volunteer organization with a significant amount of mass 
care feeding experience. As such the SBC has the capability to respond to a disaster 
assistance request with a physical presence on the disaster scene within 24 hours.61 
                                                 
59 Kevin Ellers (Salvation Army, ELO/ELF Central Territory, Territorial Disaster Coordinator), 
interview by author, January 10, 2007. 
60 American Red Cross and the North American Mission Board, Southern Baptist Convention, 
statement of understanding effective September 1, 2007 through December 31, 2011. 
61 Danny Decker (Southern Baptist Convention, Missouri State Director), interview by author, January 
31, 2007. 
 39
The SBC is managed at the national level by the North American Mission Board 
(NAMBD) disaster relief program. Like its sister organizations the ARC and the 
Salvation Army, it is managed by a few managers at the national level with its main 
strength focused at the state and local level.62 The NAMBD has approximately 100 
feeding units that have an estimated feeding capacity of 750,000 meals per day. While 
this is a tremendous capability, when one considers that this catastrophic event affects 
eight states, this translates into a capability to feed approximately 31,250 people three 
meals per day in each of the eight impacted states. This solution also requires the total 
commitment of the NAMB resource pool leaving no reserves for other more routine 
obligations throughout the nation.63 
As an outgrowth of the NAMB feeding stations becoming a hub of activity, the 
Southern Baptist Convention is also involved in the bulk distribution of resources that 
support the feeding operations as well as meeting some of the basic human needs of the 
disaster victims. These resources often come from donations from other churches from 
other parts of the country and are in the form of food, ice and drinking water. The 
Southern Baptist partner with the ARC and the Salvation Army to provide a “one-stop-
shop” for food, bulk distribution, chaplain services et cetera, developed around a site they 
are administering.64 
When directly asked if the maximum capability of the NAMB would be sufficient 
to address the mass feeding requirement posed by a catastrophic New Madrid seismic 
event, Director Caison responded: 
I am very doubtful that we could. We supported emergency management 
in Houston and put in 2 or 3 kitchens in order to cook. We worked with 
our local associations and churches and even though they did not have 
mobile feeding units between their kitchen and between local resources, 
our volunteers stepped into those centers and started working as well, so 
we mobilized a lot of volunteers across the United States to meet the 
needs. The numbers that we are looking at with a New Madrid incident are 
                                                 
62 There are currently 42 state conventions. 
63 Mickey Caison (Southern Baptist Convention, Adult Volunteer Mobilization Director for the North 
American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention), interview by author, February 8, 2007. 
64 Caison, interview. 
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exponentially higher that what there was coming out of New Orleans. If 
we bring in the 45,000 Southern Baptist Churches across the United 
States, we would be able to help, but we are not going to be prepared or 
have a plan.65 
The NAMB continuously seeks ways of improving its capability to provide 
disaster support. It is currently looking at more efficient and effective ways to partner 
with other organizations that are like-minded and have similar missions. They include 
Convoy of Hope, Operation Blessing, Samaritan’s Purse and the Billy Graham 
Association to mention a few. 
The Southern Baptist Convention has a focused mass feeding mission and is 
organized to maximize its resources. Formal partnership with the TSA, and to a lesser 
extent the ARC, should form an effective large-scale mass feeding capability within the 
state. Combining the internal bulk distribution capabilities of the Southern Baptist 
Convention and the TSA with the distribution capability of the Convoy of Hope should 
provide sufficient resource support to insure continuous feeding operations within the 
affected disaster area. The Southern Baptist Convention should be given the 
responsibility to assist TSA in the management of mass feeding operations. 
6. Convoy of Hope 
A newly energized partner in disaster preparedness and response in Missouri is 
the Convoy of Hope. The Convoy of Hope is a faith-based charitable organization formed 
in Springfield, Missouri in 1994 by the now president Hal Donaldson as an outreach 
program providing groceries, assistance finding jobs and presentation of the gospel. The 
program’s city-wide success soon led to the Convoy of Hope becoming a global 
organization impacting the lives of nearly 16,000,000 people in 26 countries. Since its 
inception the Convoy of Hope has distributed over $100,000,000 worth of food to people 
in need.66 
                                                 
65 Caison, interview. 
66 Steve Irwin (Convoy of Hope, Associate Director, U.S. Disaster Response), interview by author, 
December 5, 2009. 
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A member of the National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) 
the Convoy of Hope has agreed to provide service on an as needed basis. The Convoy of 
Hope does not have a large number of formal agreements or memorandums of 
understanding or agreement (MOU/MOA) with its faith-based partners. Instead it 
operates on a more flexible response system by providing resources upon request. The 
exceptions to this modality are the states of Florida and North Carolina. The Convoy of 
Hope has formal MOUs with these hurricane prone states, and the Convoy of Hope has 
been included in these state’s preparedness plans. 67 
Based out of Springfield, Missouri with expertise in the international distribution 
of goods, the Convoy of Hope seemed a natural fit for the Missouri disaster preparedness 
effort. The State-wide Volunteer Coordinator requested the Convoy of Hope’s assistance 
in the program in 2006 and since that time the Convoy of Hope has assisted Missouri in 
disaster response work focusing on bulk distribution. It is the State-wide Volunteer 
Coordinator’s intention that the Convoy of Hope will assume the role as the primary 
provider and responsible volunteer organization for the bulk distribution mission.68 
The Convoy of Hope is a lean organization with approximately 100 staff with the 
ability to rapidly expand and contract as needed during time of crisis. During disasters, 
the national headquarters in Springfield becomes the central point of management. 
Liaisons are placed with FEMA and the affected state emergency management 
agency/organization. The strategy is that coordination will be accomplished through a 
network of churches and faith-based organizations with the Assembly of God forming the 
primary backbone of the structure.69 The Convoy of Hope relies heavily on volunteer 
teams or groups formed among partner churches. These groups make the entire process 
work and allowed the Convoy of Hope to reach the level of success that it has achieved in 
its relatively short history.70 
                                                 
67 Irwin, interview. 
68 Dante Gliniecki, Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, State Volunteer Coordinator, 
Interview by author, December 5, 2009. 
69 Irwin, interview. 
70 Convoy of Hope, “Church Connection,” (2008) http://www.convoyofhope.org/go/church (accessed 
December 23, 2008). 
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While relatively new to disaster response, the Convoy of Hope has demonstrated 
the ability to provide the distribution of bulk resources. A fairly lean organization, it 
relies on its ability to expand and contract in size to meet its distribution obligations. The 
formal inclusion of the Convoy of Hope in the Missouri disaster program through 
MOU/MOAs and partnered with the TSA, ARC and Southern Baptist convention should 
result in an expanded distribution network capable of supporting the mass feeding 
network. 
The current capability of the Convoy of Hope will have to be greatly expanded to 
meet the projected bulk distribution needs projected for a major New Madrid event. The 
inclusion of the other faith-based organizations also residing within the state is necessary 
to maximize the state ESF-6 response capability. The Convoy of Hope should be given 
overall responsibility for bulk distribution operations under the supervision of the 
Department of Social Services. This responsibility would include guiding all of the other 
volunteer organizations that have chosen bulk distribution as their contribution to the 
disaster response. 
7. Other Volunteer Organizations 
Faith-Based Disaster Recovery Organizations involve a wide range of both 
religious and secular human services agencies that carry on collaborative, cooperative 
and coordinated work to meet the unmet disaster needs of vulnerable populations. These 
organizations have become accepted and vital components in restoration of communities 
following disasters.  
An unusual phenomenon occurs naturally following disasters. There are often 
more volunteers available than opportunities for which to volunteer. This is also true for 
catastrophic disasters for the initial response period, which is usually a few days 
immediately following the event. This is usually due to the fact that most of these 
volunteers are altruistic but untrained and unaffiliated. Unaffiliated, spontaneous 
volunteers usually prove a burden to disaster response as emergency managers and 
incident commanders generally seek the skilled, trained, vetted volunteers necessary to  
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successfully provide services to an affected area. Church or community groups will often 
open a shelter, only to become overwhelmed by the amount of work that is involved in 
successfully managing a sheltering operation.71  
The ARC currently trains Disaster Services Human Resources (DSHR) volunteers 
all across the country because it understand there is no better way to accomplish a task 
than with trained, healthy volunteer staff with realistic expectations. The ARC does not 
have adequate resources to provide this training in the volume required for most states to 
reach a 10 percent shelter capacity that the Missouri Statewide Volunteer Coordinator 
recommends. 
Faith-based organizations (FBO) capitalize on what people of faith already desire, 
that is to provide protection for themselves through individual preparedness and 
continuity of operations planning for the FBO. FBOs that are prepared and able to 
maintain continuity of operations during times of disaster it is in a much stronger position 
to provide aid to the surrounding community. 
Within this context, the FBOs must be given the knowledge and tools to better 
equip themselves, their membership and to take ownership of and responsibility for the 
phases of emergency mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. If an FBO is ill 
prepared as an organization itself, the membership will suffer along with the community. 
The success of every shelter is important to the overall mission of ESF-6. Other volunteer 
organizations that should not be overlooked when considering mass care preparedness are 
groups such as the Moose, Elks, Eagles, Shriners, Masons, Veterans of Foreign Wars 
(VFW) and the Marine Corps League, just to name a few. While these organizations are 
not faith-based, they are altruistic and community spirited in nature and should prove 
eager preparedness partners if given an opportunity with the appropriate level of structure 
and support. These groups are part of the process within the preparedness plans of some 
local communities, but remain an untapped resource in the majority of local plans. 
Many of the volunteer agency integration techniques outlined in Chapter IV under 
the heading D in subheading c, the inclusion of faith-based organizations portion of this 
                                                 
71 Gliniecki, interview, 2006. 
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thesis will also apply to these organizations. Figure 5 below demonstrates the current 
level of Missouri Mass care capability compared to the target of 10 percent of the 
affected population. 
 
Figure 5.   Current Mass Care Capability within Missouri 72 
As indicated in Figure 5 above, a gap exists between the existing mass care 
response capability of less than one percent compared to the recommended target 
capability of 10 percent (purple) of the projected population of the affected area. With 
each of the current major contributing volunteer organizations indicating that it does not 
possess the capacity to address the mass care needs of the population impacted by an 
event of this magnitude, it is necessary to find the means to increase this capacity through 
new initiatives. 
                                                 
72 Gliniecki, interview, 2009. 
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C. STATUS OF CURRENT REGIONAL PREPAREDNESS WITHIN THE 
STATE 
There has been little progress in the development of regional mass care 
preparedness to date. Regional committees have been established in the hope of 
providing a more coordinated and formal preparedness effort within the established state 
regions. Regional meetings have taken place, but little of the available regional funding 
has been dedicated to this effort, resulting in little forward progress. At this time the bulk 
of mass care preparedness still resides at the state level and its partnerships with the 
MOVOAD. 
The 2006 establishment of the nine Regional Homeland Security Oversight 
Committees (RHSOC) marks the initiation of a regional approach to homeland security 
for the state of Missouri. Each RHSOC is comprised of a chairperson and a regional 
representative for each of the emergency response disciplines: fire service, law 
enforcement,73 emergency management, county health, homeland security response 
system, public works, mayor or city administrator, county commissioner, private industry 
and public utility, emergency medical service, 911 telecommunications and volunteers 
organizations. While the DSS maintains responsibility for ESF-6 at the state level, the 
responsibility for ESF-6 preparedness and response at the regional level has fallen to the 
volunteer organization representative.  
The state passed a total of eight million dollars of DHS grant funding to the 
RHSOCs in 200774 for their use in prevention, preparedness and response. One of the 
DHS grant investment justifications submitted by the RHSOCs for the expenditure of 
these funds was for the enhancement of their mass care capability. This enhancement was 
to be accomplished primarily through planning efforts and training of the volunteer 
organizations responsible for the ESF-6 response mission. This is significant in that prior 
to this grant cycle there had been little or no funding allocated for this purpose.75  
                                                 
73 Includes representatives of both Sheriff’s Department and Municipal Police Departments. 
74 Through the FY2006 Department of Homeland Security preparedness grant cycle. 
75 These funds were allocated from the FY2006 Grant Program. 
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Also significant is according to the grant award notices received by the state of Missouri 
for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 the grant allocation for the state of Missouri for the 2007 
grant cycle was reduced by over 57 percent when compared to the 2006 award by DHS.76  
While a noble effort was expended in 2006 to fund the establishment the regional 
mass care capability through the RHSOCs, the future of the current regional program is 
in question as the funding diminishes. Given the nature of the competitive system for 
securing funding, it is also questionable how much of the remaining funding the 
volunteer organizations can secure. There has been a long standing tendency to award the 
bulk of preparedness grant funding to traditional response organizations such as the fire 
service, law enforcement and the emergency medical service. Discussions at the state 
Department of Public Safety level have resulted in a request for state general revenue 
funding to continue support for a portion of the programs receiving federal cuts but mass 
care was not one of them. 
D. INTERSTATE COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION 
The state of Missouri currently relies totally on its ESF-6 partner volunteer 
organizations and their national organizational structures for interstate mass care support. 
If additional resources are needed, organizations such as the American Red Cross, the 
Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist Convention will have to request them from 
their national networks. 
Also of value is the capability to request specific resources through the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). These requests for assistance 
would focus primarily on state controlled assets and would largely assist with the 
command and control function or overall management of the ESF-6 response effort at the 
various levels of government. The limitation of EMAC in this or other catastrophic  
 
                                                 
76 Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness Directorate, Office of Grants and Training, Part 1: 
Project Summary in Grant Manager’s Memorandum, (Project no. 2007-GE-T7-0034, budget period from 
07/01/2007 to 06/30/2010), 1; Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness Directorate, Office of 
Grants and Training, Part 1: Project Summary in Grant Manager’s Memorandum (Project no. 2006-GE-T6-
0067, budget period from 07/01/2006 to 06/30/2008, 1). 
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events is that the majority of the resources that provide direct ESF-6 assistance currently 
reside in the volunteer sector and those resources are already requested through those 
respective organizations by the effected state.   
The state of Missouri does not currently have any MOU/MOAs in place for 
specific mass care support with any other states. Instead it currently relies solely on the 
standard EMAC request procedures. While the standard EMAC request procedures work 
well for less urgent requests, they rely on interstate negotiation for requested resources 
and therefore take some time to complete the desired transactions. The author 
recommends the implementation of MOU/MOAs for time sensitive resources so that 
partner states could react more quickly once they received confirmation from Missouri 
that it indeed needs the agreed upon resources. 
Another available avenue for specific resources is through the normal resource 
request process through FEMA Region VII. The federal government is limited in its 
ability to provide direct support in the form of personnel and facilities for mass sheltering 
and feeding. It does have resources to applicable to the bulk distribution of resources, 
such as transportation, ice, food, water and other goods. Refer to Figure 6 in Chapter IV 
for the intergovernmental ESF-6 assistance flow. 
E. EXISTING CAPABILITY SUMMARY 
The core volunteer organizations currently involved in mass care response within 
Missouri are dedicated, highly motivated partners that recognize their current disaster 
response limitations as applied to a catastrophic event impacting multiple states 
concurrently. The ARC, TSA, Southern Baptists Convention and Convoy of Hope all 
have solid leadership structures and extensive disaster response experience. They seem to 
be the key building blocks around which a larger capability may be built. The ARC, TSA, 
Southern Baptists and the Convoy of Hope recognize the limits of their current disaster 
response capacity as applied to a catastrophic disaster. The largest of which is a shortage 
of trained volunteer staff.  
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The state agencies seem reluctant to commit a sufficient level of fiscal and 
personnel resources toward the expansion of mass care response capability. To date, a 
minimal commitment of fluctuating federal grant money has been committed to this 
effort with even less state general revenue applied. The state planning process for mass 
care seems disjointed with the simultaneous application of the all-hazards and threat 
specific planning modalities. The adoption of a more focused planning methodology 
coupled with an increase of funding to support the expansion of the mass care response 
manpower would greatly contribute to an increase in disaster response capacity. 
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IV. PREPAREDNESS RECOMMENDATIONS  
This section addresses various policy and systemic changes to the preparedness 
modality currently in use within the state.77 These changes include strategy and policy 
modification, change in leadership perspective, systems development and or adoption, 
enhancement of partnerships and the stimulation of citizen volunteerism.  
A. PARADIGM SHIFT  
The response phase involving large-scale sheltering operations require intensive 
numbers of personnel and resources. The traditional view that the “ARC will take care of 
it” and if it has a deficient level of resources, then the Department of Defense will assume 
the responsibility is completely inaccurate. The ARC does not possess the capacity to 
meet the sheltering requirements of a catastrophic disaster. The Department of Defense 
possesses neither the equipment nor the trained personnel to provide community disaster 
shelters. The necessary level of mass care in a catastrophic event requires the total 
cooperation and coordination of all volunteer and governmental organizations.  
Experience has taught that the current level of vague, general planning with 
minimal resource commitment to preparedness leads to an ad-hoc response with a “make 
it up as we go” modality. This not only hinders disaster response, but also delays the 
recovery effort and jeopardizes the perceived success of the overall disaster response. 
There are several factors that may contribute to this status quo. One factor is the lack of 
strategic mass care preparedness guidance at the federal and state governmental levels. 
Another is that the current funding levels limit the amount of time and personnel that may 
be committed to planning process. The last and the one heard by the author the most is 
the existing consensus among the leadership that the less detail included in a plan the 
more flexibility the leadership has in formulating their response plan as they go along 
This paradigm shift requires formalizing and strengthening the current 
relationships between the volunteer, private sector and governmental organizations 
                                                 
77 Discussed in this thesis in Chapter III, subsections A and B.  
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responsible for mass care. The current disaster planning model should be examined for 
efficacy in catastrophic events and include the national, state and in-state regional 
visions. Also of great importance is the development of a stronger mass care capability 
within the state including: volunteer recruitment, training and development, tracking 
systems, shelter database and an improved mass care communications network. The more 
self-reliant Missouri is during a catastrophic event, the better able it is to save and serve 
disaster victims within a timeframe that increases effectiveness with less reliance on other 
unaffected states that are expected to provide assistance. In Table 1 below is a list of 
general findings and recommendations by the author. 
Table 1.   General Findings and Recommendations by Author 
Finding Recommendation 
Lack of strategic target capability for sheltering 
capacity in current state preparedness plans, 
Chapter III, subsection A. 
Identify the target shelter capacity for the state 
of 10% of the affected population, Chapter IV, 
subsection B. 
79 is too many volunteer organizations 
reporting directly to the Department of Social 
Services creates potential coordination 
challenges, Chapter III, subsection A. 
Modify the leadership structure from its 
current flat or horizontal reporting modality to 
a more hierarchical or vertical structure, 
Chapter IV, subsection C. 
Many volunteer organizations operate relatively 
independently, without coordination with the 
ARC, TSA, SBC or the state. EOC. This 
creates a burden on the system when they 
exceed their capabilities during disasters. It also 
results in some duplication of effort, Chapter 
III, subsection B. 
The new management structure should require 
reporting by the majority of the volunteer 
agencies to through the ARC, TSA or SBC 
dependent upon the mission or task assigned 
to the reporting organization, Chapter IV, 
subsection F. 
Two separate planning modalities at the state 
level, the all-hazards and individual planning 
models, Chapter III, subsection A. 
The state incorporate the stand alone 
earthquake response plan that exists within 
Annex Y of the SEOP throughout the current 
all-hazards plan, Chapter IV, subsection D. 
Minimal number of formal partnerships formed 
between volunteer mass care providers. The 
only formal partnerships identified are between 
the ARC, SBC, TSA and Convoy of Hope and 
are discussed in Chapters: III, subsection B; III, 
subsection B; III, subsection B; and III, 
subsection B. This finding is largely based on 
the lack of evidence supporting existing formal 
partnerships. 
Establish a system in which the volunteer 
organizations have a structure in which to 
partner, Chapter IV, subsections E and F. 
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Lack of sheltering, mass feeding and bulk 
distribution capacity within the ARC, TSA and 
SBC for catastrophic events, Chapter III, 
subsections B, under ARC, TSA, SBC & 
Convoy of Hope. 
The Governor’s Disaster Recovery 
Partnership Department of Social Services and 
MOVOAD conduct a coordinated effort to 
recruit volunteer organizations willing to 
accept roles in mass care and assign them to 
work with either the ARC, TSA or SBC as a 
mentor organization and reporting chain. 
Chapter IV, subsection F. 
Lack of funding support for the initial reform of 
the current mass care preparedness system and 
sustainment beyond reform, Chapter III, 
subsections A and C.  
The state must commit sufficient financial 
resources for the initial reform and 
sustainment of mass care preparedness, 
possibly through state general revenue, DHS 
grants, USDA rural development block grants 
Chapter IV, subsection G. 
B. NATIONAL AND STATE STRATEGY 
Recognizing that the strength of ESF-6 is at the regional, state and local levels 
does not in any way mitigate the importance of a national vision coupled with a 
complementary state vision. Without a mutually supporting vision at the national and 
state levels, strategic planning at the state and local levels is significantly challenged. 
This begins with the National Response Framework assigning management of the 
federal ESF-6 response and recovery to FEMA and the assignment of the various federal 
agencies, including the ARC, their particular areas of responsibility. The ARC is assigned 
as the “primary agency” for ESF-6. As such, it is responsible for overall coordination of 
the federal ESF-6 effort under FEMA guidance. The ARC role at the federal level as a 
coordinating body is logical, as it is providing a portion of the committed mass care 
resources available at the state and local levels. 
The State Emergency Operations Plan (SEOP) follows the federal model by 
appointing a state agency as the primary agency with the majority of the coordination 
assigned to the ARC. The SEOP departs from the NRF with the assignment of ESF-6 to 
DSS as opposed to emergency management. DSS is much more suited to the actual 
coordination of the mass care mission than its federal counterpart as it has a presence in 
every county in the state; and as a social services organization, it should have a much 
closer relationship with the local communities it supports. This structure works well for  
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non-catastrophic disasters, but catastrophic events require more capacity from volunteer 
agencies (VOLAGs) and significantly more management than DSS has committed to 
ESF-6. 
The federal and state guidance promotes disaster preparedness, response and 
recovery through the assignment of general responsibility while overlooking the 
establishment of a capability driven system (particularly at the state level). The 
assignment of responsibility without the establishment of expectations or the desired “end 
state” and real capacity to conduct operations with staff, equipment and resources lead to 
generic plans that do little to foster actual response and recovery capability. This is less 
concern with the federal plan as it lists some of the necessary mass care capabilities in the 
Target Capabilities List version 1.1.78 The federal response system must be prepared to 
provide support as the state approaches its resource limit. As such, the federal guidance 
may be more open ended than that of the state.  
While the National Response Framework is more loosely structured, it does 
identify the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency as the ESF coordinators and primary agencies responsible for ESF-6.79 No 
evidence was discovered in any federal document or Web site researched or within the 
practical experience of the author indicating these two agencies have now or have ever 
possessed a demonstrated capability to conduct competent mass care operations. They 
simply do not possess the manpower, trained or untrained, to effectively conduct shelter 
or feeding operations on this scale. The only ESF-6 support organization mentioned in 
the National Response Framework with the capability of providing this support is the 
American Red Cross. Through its connection with the affected states, this organization 
will already be providing support at its maximum capacity should a New Madrid seismic 
event of this scale occur. 
                                                 
78 The target capabilities are not carried over into the supporting Universal Task List version 2.1 
leaving a significant gap in guidance for the states; Department of Homeland Security, Target Capability 
List (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2007). 
79Department of Homeland Security, “Overview: ESF and Support Annexes Coordinating Federal 
Assistance in Support of the National Response Framework, ESF #6-1,” in National Response Framework, 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
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The state, on the other hand, must understand the limits of disaster resource 
delivery in order to clearly identify the trigger points for requesting Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and federal resources. This is much more 
easily achieved if an overarching mass care goal or desired capability is set, such as 
sheltering up to 10 percent of the state population.  
The inclusion of baseline capabilities in the state strategy would not only allow 
for a more effective and detailed strategic plan, it would also support the other areas of 
preparedness such as training and exercises. However, at this time no such vision 
statement or strategic plan for the development of ESF-6 exists at the state level.  
C. ESTABLISH CLEAR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND 
GUIDANCE 
The state of Missouri SEOP in combination with the SEOC Standard Operational 
Guidelines (SOG) has established leadership structure from the governor through the 
assignment of the Emergency Support Functions to specific state agencies. The 
leadership structure within ESF-6 is less clear and should be more clearly defined. The 
traditional roles of the ARC, Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist Convention are: 
sheltering, mass feeding and bulk distribution. These three have established a good 
working relationship over the years, having the most developed MOU/MOAs in the 
volunteer community.80 However, experience within the state of Missouri indicates that 
these organizations operate the most efficiently and effectively with designated 
responsibilities coordinated within a structured command and control system such as the 
National Incident Management System coordinated at the local and state governmental 
levels.  
The challenges begin when the other 76 well intentioned volunteer organizations 
enter the disaster response, followed closely by unaffiliated, spontaneous or emergent 
charitable organizations and churches. When these unaffiliated and ill prepared 
organizations open their facilities as shelters and expend their minimal resources, they 
then turn to local and state government for assistance with no notice and typically 
                                                 
80 Gliniecki, interview, 2006.  
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unreasonable expectations. It is at this point that the unaffiliated, spontaneous shelters 
and volunteers become part of the problem, not the solution, as they place unanticipated 
burden on the logistics network. 
According to the current National Incident Management System guidance from 
DHS, the optimum span of control for the management of disaster personnel is a ratio of 
one to five with one to seven being the maximum recommended.81 Seventy-nine 
organizations currently reporting to the two part-time DSS managers and one entry level 
employee in a flat organizational table is unmanageable. A more hierarchical 
organizational structure is needed to reduce the span of control. The development of 
formal MOU/MOAs defining what mission(s) the individual organizations accept, the 
level of resources they can support them would allow the design of a more functional and 
efficient response organization. The more focused the mission or task the more easily 
resources may be identified and dedicated to them. This organization would also be in 
compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) guidelines required 
under the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. The recommended NIMS 
compliant management structure should resemble that depicted in Figure 6 below. 
                                                 
81 National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, Instructor Manual, Unit 3: Basic Features of ICS, 
(internal training document for ICS-100: Introduction to ICS, Department of Homeland Security, 
Washington, D.C., 2005). 
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Figure 6.   Mass Care Flow Chart–State Emergency Management 
On a positive note, the state has officially adopted the NIMS. Based on the 
author’s experience, full acceptance and implementation by the regions and organizations 
involved in mass care will significantly streamline and improve the management 
structure within ESF-6. This will bring all of the participating volunteer organizations 
into the same management system used by the entire emergency response community 
within the state. The ARC, TSA and SBC are already implementing NIMS within their 
management structure, but many other volunteer organizations have not done so. There 
remains a significant amount of outreach to these other organizations for their inclusion 
into the system. 
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D. ENHANCED PLANNING  
A direct result of the performance of government at all levels during the response 
to Hurricane Katrina, the Office of Domestic Preparedness Information Bulletin 197 was 
issued on November 23, 2005 directing all of the states, as well as cities designated as 
recipients of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant funding, to complete a full 
disaster response plan review and submit their self-assessments to the Department of 
Homeland Security.82 Missouri’s assessment resulted in an executive level decision to 
add Annex Y to its existing SEOP. Annex Y is a catastrophic disaster document focused 
on the New Madrid seismic threat. Annex Y is essentially an incomplete “stand alone” 
earthquake response plan inserted into the state all-hazards plan. It may have proven 
more effective to expand the existing all-hazard planning model on which the SEOP is 
based. The decision to construct Annex Y in its current form was based on the need for a 
time sensitive resolution in order to meet federal guidelines. The expansion of the current 
all-hazards model would have taken more time. Attention should be given to resolve the 
dissonance between the two planning modalities. 
According to the FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Producing 
Emergency Plans, emergency planning addresses all hazards and must involve all 
partners in the planning process.83 Even though the planning process may be affected by 
time constraints, the plans are living documents and are continuously improved. Given 
the continuous nature of the planning process and the adoption of the all-hazards 
planning process at the federal and state levels it makes sense that the hazard specific 
Annex Y be incorporated into the traditional all-hazards State Emergency Operations 
Plan.84 
The mass care sheltering guidance contained in pages Appendices 5–1 and 5–2 of 
Annex Y adds little to the existing general guidance in the balance of the SEOP and could 
certainly be incorporated into Mass Care Annex (Annex I) of the SEOP. The little 
                                                 
82 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness, Information Bulletin 197, 
Subject: Nationwide Plan Review, issued on November 23, 2005. 
83 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101. 
84 Ibid. 
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additional guidance provided would prove useful in other disaster scenarios such as large-
scale winter storms where significant sheltering may be necessary. 
In order to be a true all hazard plan, Annex I should provide all information 
necessary for DSS, SEMA,  MOVOAD and other relevant staff to effectively respond to 
and recover from the greatest disaster threat facing the state, a New Madrid seismic 
event. The expansion of Annex I will require the close cooperation of SEMA, DSS, 
MOVOAD and the Governor’s Disaster Recovery Partnership. The benefit of the 
inclusion of the earthquake response guidance from Annex Y into the ESF-6 section of 
the all-hazards SEOP is the creation of a true all-hazards plan. Retrieval of response 
guidance from several different sections of a large plan may contribute to the confusion 
of response personnel for whom emergency response is not their daily responsibility. The 
additional information located within the appropriate portions of the all-hazards plan 
facilitates easier information retrieval and concentrates the additional options available 
for catastrophic events in the same location should their implementation become 
necessary as the seriousness of an event escalates. 
1. Identify and Track Potential Shelters 
The ARC, working closely with the local jurisdictions has identified 
approximately 335,000 shelter beds within the state. It is only two-thirds of the ARC goal 
within the state and does not include shelters run by organizations other than the ARC. A 
New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake may render many of these beds unavailable within 
the affected area. With this in mind it becomes evident that the other VOLAGs, including 
the faith-based organizations (FBOs), have a critical role in the overall success of a large-
scale sheltering operation. It is imperative the state formally locate, evaluate and track 
these potential shelters for inclusion within the formal response system. 
The ARC recently implemented the National Shelter System (NSS). A database 
intended to track Red Cross shelters around the country. Widespread use of this system 
within the ARC has led to recognition of the ARC’s leadership in this area. It has become 
the de facto national standard for tracking available shelters. The NSS can provide the 
state of Missouri with the needed shelter tracking capability it currently lacks.   
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The state has adopted the ARC shelter standard and the National Shelter System 
database. In order to achieve successful expansion of the state sheltering capability, any 
volunteer organizations wishing to participate in the sheltering mission must be identified 
and invited to participate, encouraged to meet these standards, include potential shelters 
in the ARC NSS database, train its staff to the ARC standard and participate in any 
necessary formal MOU/MOAs. This is the only tracking system that currently 
demonstrates the capability to effectively meet the need. This inclusion of the other 
VOLAGS in this system is necessary for the state to gain an accurate picture of the 
number and location of available shelters. The only organization that currently has its 
shelter information in the system is the ARC; this provides an incomplete picture of state 
shelter capacity and resource needs for continuous shelter operations during a 
catastrophic event. 
2. Select Viable Displaced Persons Tracking System 
The state of Missouri currently lacks a system for the tracking of displaced 
persons or evacuees during times of disaster. The current system of reporting by shelters 
includes the formal ARC shelters and any ad-hoc or emergent shelters known to the state, 
providing a daily numerical count of citizens occupying the shelters each night. 
The ARC does have a family quasi-welfare/reunification system in place that 
centers on the ARC “Safe and Well” Web site. Registration as “safe and well” on this site 
by disaster victims is enabled and promoted by the ARC both inside and outside of the 
area affected by the disaster. Concerned family members, knowing the victim’s phone 
number or address, may search for his or her status on this site. 
The ARC also assists with the location of displaced individuals and families 
through its Welfare Information Centers (WIC) and Field Teams. This is a more 
traditional search method and requires a significant number of man-hours dedicated to the 
digital and physical search. While the WIC will assist with family reunification using the 
traditional designated internal ARC tools, the primary role is to field requests for health 
services and disaster mental health submitted by ARC chapters, provide initial case 
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review and research and help people register on the Safe and Well Web site. 85This 
system may serve as a marginally functional interim system until a more effective or 
integrated system can be identified and implemented.  
Selecting the most efficient and effective system while encouraging its 
recognition as the national standard should be considered a high priority by DHS. This 
may be an updated version of the current ARC-WIC system or the adoption of an entirely 
new modality.  
This proposed system may utilize bar codes, Radio Frequency Identification 
Device (RFID), or other technologies integrated in wrist bands issued at shelters, aid 
stations, or local facilities. The Kansas City metropolitan area has adopted a bar code 
system which it shared with St. Louis during preparations to receive evacuees from 
Hurricane Katrina, but unfortunately the expected Katrina evacuees were routed to states 
other than Missouri and the system did not get used. A system of this type would track 
evacuees though the system until permanently relocated or returned to their community. 
A system of this type should greatly improve the overall efficiency of the sheltering 
system. The integration of the individual tracking system and the ARC shelter database 
theoretically should prove synergistic. 
3. Develop Information Sharing Communications Network 
The state of Missouri launched an emergency/disaster management 
communications system in 2008 that integrates E-TEAM, an access portal, and a resource 
database into one system in an effort to meet the communication needs of statewide 
emergency management. This system does allow the mass care coordinators to 
communicate through all levels of government and request resources anywhere high 
speed internet is available. While valuable as a communications tool, this system does not 
possess the capability to track mass care shelters or displaced persons, therefore 
additional mass care communications tools are needed. A key component of the adoption 
of the ARC National Shelter System (NSS) and a displaced persons tracking system 
                                                 
85 American Red Cross, “Individual Client Services” in “Disaster Services Program Guidance,” 
(internal document, American Red Cross, Capital Region Chapter, Jefferson, Missouri, 2007), 2. 
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should be the linking of these additional databases within the Missouri Emergency 
Resource Information System (MERIS). This linkage would facilitate the tracking of 
operating shelters, available shelters in reserve and displaced persons throughout the 
sheltering system as well as the tracking of the resources supporting the shelter 
operations at the local and state levels. 
E. MOBILIZING THE CITIZENRY—VOLUNTEERISM–CREATING A 
NEW CITIZEN ETHIC 
Following the September 11, 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks on the East Coast, President 
Bush announced his call to the American public to volunteer and participate in his vision 
of a nationwide network of volunteer programs named Citizen Corps. President Bush’s 
vision and program was sound and some state and local jurisdictions have developed 
functional programs. President John F. Kennedy made a similar call for volunteerism 
when he established the Peace Corps during his administration, and the program was 
successful.86 The success of presidential requests of this type largely rest on the charm 
and popularity of the president making the request and the level of desperation the nation 
faces. President Bush lacks President Kennedy’s charm and popularity, and unfortunately 
in an effort to calm the populace President Bush missed the opportunity to effectively 
communicate the need to mobilize the citizenry. Instead, in a post-September 11 speech, 
he told the citizenry to “live your normal lives and hug your children”.87 
In order to significantly improve the success of the Citizen Corps and 
volunteerism in general, it is imperative that the requesting government representatives 
be closer to the people served than merely a distant voice in Washington, D.C. The state 
and local elected officials, as well as respected community leaders such as fire and police 
chiefs, must not only ask their constituents to participate but must also explain why it is 
important and just how their participation will make a difference in national 
                                                 
86 Thurston Clarke, Ask Not: The Inauguration of John F. Kennedy and the Speech That Changed 
America (New York: Holt & Company, 2004), 6. 
87 eMediaMillWorks, “President Bush Addresses the Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html 
(accessed March 21, 2008). 
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preparedness. As this new wave of volunteers emerges, they must be partnered with 
traditional volunteer organizations. It is these organizations that may most effectively 
train and utilize these volunteers, keeping them engaged over time. It is a well accepted 
maxim in volunteer management that if an organization ignores its volunteers, they will 
go away.88 
1. Supporting the Community 
There are insufficient personnel resources in the emergency management system 
to support the capacity needed to achieve the level of preparedness adequate to support a 
large scale New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake. Preparedness must occur in every 
community (county and city) to the degree that citizens in each community volunteer in 
sufficient numbers to provide reliable and competent shelter teams, feeding teams and 
bulk distribution teams. Just as nearly every community has some form of fire and police 
protection so too should every community have adequate disaster response and relief 
capability. This requires a new ethic in society, an ethic that dictates that disaster 
response is the civic duty of every able-bodied citizen. Can such an ethic be achieved?   
The answer lies within each community and within each citizen but several 
aspects of this issue are clear. The need for preparedness has already been made 
abundantly clear through numerous disasters especially Hurricane Katrina. The training, 
procedures, command and control structures, support agencies and many other 
foundations of mass care already exist in the Red Cross, Southern Baptist, Salvation 
Army and emergency management. The challenge is taking the infrastructure that exists, 
transplanting it to where it is needed (read every community in Missouri) and growing 
the citizen resources to populate and resource the infrastructure so that it can operate 
somewhat independently in the largest disasters until the full impact of national level 
resources arrive to relieve or support the local citizenry. This requires cooperation 
between state and local emergency managers in a statewide recruiting effort to reach the 
many affiliated and independent volunteer agencies where the supplemental manpower 
exists to greatly enhance sheltering capacity. Interested organizations must be integrated 
                                                 
88 Gliniecki, interview, February 15, 2008. 
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into the mass care management structure in a manner that allows them to meet their 
altruistic needs, as well as constructively accomplish their agreed upon mass care 
assignments. 
a. American Red Cross 
The ARC realizes that it does not currently have the intrinsic capability to 
meet the mass care needs of a NMSZ. The ARC is using its new partnership doctrine to 
address the need to build capacity by involving more of the community in its effort to 
build the necessary mass care resources to address a catastrophic disaster.89 As the ARC 
moves to the next step in achieving the immensely challenging goal of adequate 
preparedness, the Red Cross is reaching out to some of its most traditional and reliable 
partners – the faith community, especially the Christian denominations that have for so 
long been the staunch allies of Red Cross. If approached with organization, resources 
organization, co-opting and partnering with the faith community should prove relatively 
straight forward in the quest to gain greater mass care preparedness, though it will still 
take time and effort to achieve. 
b. Salvation Army 
The Salvation Army has moved decisively toward a significant integration 
with the ARC and the SBC in mass care preparedness and continues to strengthen this 
relationship which can only enhance preparedness and the safety of the citizens of the 
state. TSA must now be prepared to assist with the integration of the balance of the 
volunteer organizations into the organized structure of ESF-6. This includes 
MOU/MOAs, training, organization, planning and their participation in disaster 
exercises. 
c. Southern Baptist Convention 
The SBC has always been closely allied with the ARC in disaster response 
and mass care operations. They are great supporters of the ARC doctrine and continue to 
                                                 
89 “Connection Preparedness and Response,” ARC Newsletter. 
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effectively response when needed. Like TSA, it must be willing and prepared to assist 
with the integration of the balance of the volunteer organizations into the organized 
structure of ESF-6. The SBC currently sets the example in motivating its congregations, 
volunteers, clergy and lay leadership. 
d. Convoy of Hope 
The Convoy of Hope should be fully integrated into the Missouri disaster 
preparedness and response program and given the responsibility as the lead volunteer 
organization for bulk distribution. As with the states of Florida and North Carolina, this 
relationship must be more formal than the Convoy of Hope’s current informal 
relationship with its faith-based partners. It must include an MOU with the state listing 
both the state and Convoy of Hope expectations and accepted responsibilities. This 
agreement should allow the Convoy of Hope to continue to provide independent local 
support through its faith-based network while simultaneously providing distribution of 
state sponsored resources during times of disaster. 
The Convoy of Hope has proven experience in providing the resource 
distribution during crisis. The success it has enjoyed providing eight state area points of 
distribution for the state government of Alabama during the Hurricane Katrina response 
demonstrates the Convoy of Hope’s current coordination and response capability.90 Even 
with the Convoy of Hope’s current capability, it is imperative that it be included in the 
development and integration of the Missouri disaster preparedness effort because a 
significant New Madrid seismic event involving an eight state response will stretch the 
Convoy of Hope’s capability beyond the breaking point. The inclusion of the Convoy of 
Hope in Missouri disaster preparedness will increase its efficiency within the state 
through the reduction of the duplication of effort. As with the ARC, TSA and the SBC, 
the Convoy of Hope will also need to expand its response capacity in order to meet the 
expected level of need. Also as with the ARC, TSA and SBC, the Convoy of Hope can 
significantly increase its capacity through a coordinated recruiting, assignment of 
responsibility and training effort sponsored by the state of Missouri. 
                                                 
90 Irwin, interview. 
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e. Faith-based Organizations 
The faith-based organizations within Missouri are already involved in 
disaster response and recovery within the state, but are an underutilized resource. They 
simply need assistance in organizing, planning, training and developing and maintaining 
resources. They also need a defined operational structure that greatly enhances the 
capabilities and strengthens that which they already possess. Successful integration of the 
concepts outlined in this document should increase shelter capability from current levels 
of 10,000 (less than one percent) to 203,931 (10 percent) of the affected population 
within the 47 counties expected to be impacted by a New Madrid event of 7.7 or higher 
on the Richter scale . 
With an increase in emphasis at the state and federal level through a 
significant expansion of the availability of education, training and exercises for the FBOs, 
Missouri should see a direct increase in its current response capability. Based on the 
volunteer ethos, it is also reasonable to expect a proportional increase in volunteerism 
within the participating areas and organizations and boost the overall disaster response 
capacity of these organizations through increased personnel numbers. This increase in 
state mass care capacity should result in a reduced demand for federal assistance in the 
management of the shelter system. Purposeful VOLAG activity such as training and 
assisting citizens in need not only provides personal reward for those involved, it often 
results in those volunteers discussing their activities with friends and acquaintances 
leading to additional recruitment and retention in the program. 
This increase in available training and exercises for the FBOs must be 
based on the adoption of the ESF-6 practices that are becoming the standards adopted by 
the ARC, TSA and SBC. The adoption of these standards coupled with an effective 
training and exercise program would allow Missouri to adequately shelter the ten percent 
of the affected population recommended by Statewide Volunteer Coordinator Dante 
Gliniecki, the ARC and the state mass care planning committee.  
To achieve this goal, it is necessary for a dedicated full-time position 
within SEMA to work closely with the Governor’s Disaster Recovery Partnership, the 
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MOVOAD, DSS, the Regional Homeland Security Oversight Committees (RHSOCs) 
and the Missouri Interfaith Disaster Response Organization (MIDRO) in an effort to 
reach out to the FBOs for effective inclusion into the formal disaster preparedness and 
response system.91 The secular volunteer response organizations, such as the ARC, and 
FBOs, such as the SBC and TSA, must also be included in this process as they are the 
backbone organization involved in disaster field operations. These organizations have the 
most experience and are in the best position to provide the necessary field organization 
and training for the more fledgling FBOs. 
Given the necessary time and resources to address this ambitious project, 
utilizing the Partnership and MOVOAD, the MIDRO is likely the best entry point into 
the FBO community for attracting interest and addressing the needs and concerns of the 
individual member FBOs. Rushing this project in the interest of political expediency will 
likely doom the project to failure as the FBOs, while interested, have many other issues 
of concern to their congregates. This project should be considered a long-term transition 
that may take as long as one to two years before transitioning into maintenance mode. As 
the Statewide Volunteer Coordinator, Mr. Gliniecki estimates that for every dollar spent 
on his salary, benefits and support costs, between $30 and $40 dollars are returned to the 
state in the form of disaster relief that would not have otherwise been spent. 
f. Emergency Management 
As the lead coordinating agency for the overall preparedness, response and 
recovery effort within the state, SEMA must recognize the need for capacity building in 
the volunteer community. Only through the building of this capacity at the state, regional, 
and local levels will the state gain the capability to actually shelter the necessary portion 
of its citizenry in a time of crisis. Without further infusion of energy and resources, 
traditional emergency response volunteer organizations have reached their maximum 
capability to support the state. It is critical that SEMA, the Governor’s Disaster Recovery 
                                                 
91 MIDRO- Begun in 1993 as the Interfaith Disaster Response Network, MIDRO has been active in 
large and small disasters since that time. At times, one or more persons have been hired as staff to facilitate 
and administer the work of the participating faith groups. Missouri Interfaith Disaster Response 
Organization, “MIDRO,” http://www.umocm.com/midro.htm (accessed December28, 2007). 
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Partnership and MOVOAD provide the necessary emphasis to engage and develop 
underutilized groups, strengthen existing partnerships and coordinate more detailed plans 
supporting ESF-6. The coordination of the vast array of faith-based organizations 
involved in the current ad-hoc disaster sheltering effort is the first obvious step in the 
process of involving citizens in mass care. Toward this end, SEMA in partnership with 
the faith community should create and support a faith-based initiative that provides 
guidance to the faith community on how to be prepared in three areas. Those areas are as 
follows: 
 Individual and family preparedness within the faith-based organizational 
congregants. 
 Continuity of operations preparedness for the day-to-day operations of the 
church or faith-based organization.  
 Community support for the Red Cross mass care missions or other human 
services missions. 
For SEMA to successfully mobilize and integrate this infusion of 
volunteerism into the mass care system, one must recognize the additional drain on 
limited state resources. The magnitude of this project requires additional staff as well as 
funding to support the coordination and planning meetings necessary to accomplish the 
task. The state has historically contributed little in the way of financial support, limiting 
investment to the salaries of one-and-one-half positions within SEMA, with the balance 
of support funding coming from the FEMA Emergency Management Preparedness and 
federal homeland security grant programs. 
g. Missouri Department of Social Services 
Within the past two years the Missouri Department of Social Services 
more positively engaged in mass care preparedness and response with the majority of 
focus on response. In order to meet the mass care needs of the state during catastrophic 
events, the DSS will need to greatly enhance its commitment to all phases of disaster 
management. The adoption of the ARC shelter training courses and the subsequent 
commitment of a few staff as trainers has proven to be a step in the right direction. The 
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Statewide Volunteer Coordinator estimates that approximately 100 deliveries of these 
courses throughout the state should be considered the minimum number of courses 
necessary to approach meeting the current need. The audience for these courses should 
consist of a mixture of DSS employees and volunteer sector personnel. SEMA is the only 
agency other than the ARC currently delivering only these courses. SEMA delivers four 
and the ARC delivers five sessions per year. DSS has been inactive in this area outside of 
its departmental employees. 
The dedication of sufficient full-time staff to emergency management 
within the DSS focused on preparedness, response and recovery from disaster is critical 
for success. As the responsibilities of the DSS Emergency Management staff cross 
divisions within the department, these positions should operate within the director’s 
office and receive the requisite amount of funding, guidance and support from the 
Department Director. It is extremely difficult for anyone to manage a department wide 
program while buried three levels down inside a single division.  
The majority of the mass care effort occurs at the local and county level. 
Therefore, it is important that the DSS have someone on its staff at the county level, and 
for larger communities the community level, who are competent to manage any issues 
related to mass care that may arise that are of concern to the state. This requires staff that 
not only meets the minimum training requirements, but is truly committed to success of 
the program. If acceptable to the DSS, these staff positions may be supplemented by 
ARC, TSA or AmeriCorps personnel as available. 
h. Citizen Corps 
Citizen Corps and the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
program in particular is a potential source of volunteers that may be capitalized upon for 
inclusion into the mass care function. Many of these volunteers continuously seek 
opportunities to serve their communities and are willing to attend the necessary training 
courses. It is important when building capacity that no opportunity is overlooked. 
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i.  Private Sector 
The integration of the private sector is important because the majority of 
donated goods passing through the bulk distribution network are donated by private 
industry and businesses. Therefore, the private sector should be represented within ESF-6 
at the state level. One potential source for this resource is the Missouri Public Private 
Partnership (MOP3). While primarily associated with the Missouri Office of Homeland 
Security, this organization has demonstrated great flexibility and a genuine willingness to 
assist in any area during time of disaster. Consideration should be given to including 
MOP3 into ESF-6. 
F. IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPT 
It is important to increase efficiency through focusing and clarifying the state 
emergency operations plan, improving mass care disaster communications, selecting 
appropriate tracking systems, restructuring ESF-6 leadership and setting clear goals. 
However, the most significant hindrance to a successful increase in mass care capacity is 
the shortage of qualified, trained personnel to staff the sheltering, feeding and bulk 
distribution functions. 
The increase in mass care response capacity within the state relies on the concept 
of identifying the primary volunteer response organizations, determining their 
responsibilities and then placing them under the lead state agency, the Department of 
Social Services. Following this is the recruitment and alignment of other supporting 
volunteer organizations with the requisite primary volunteer organization. The steps 
outlined below are one way to secure the desired increase in mass care response capacity. 
It is critical that this concept be implemented at the state and local levels with a 
considerable amount of coordination and cooperation. Strong organization at the state 
level is important for the consistent state-wide management of both the preparedness and 
response processes. Acceptance and cooperation at the local level are equally important 
as without these, this system will break down and revert to the current system along with 
its current limitations. Surprisingly, as this concept was discussed with various volunteer 
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organizations, what the author thought of as relatively minor adjustments in the system 
were viewed by these organizations as radical, but optimistically received changes.  
The most efficient path for the education of the FBOs concerning their potential 
integration into the disaster management system is through the conduct of a state and 
FBO disaster conference. The purpose of the conference is to gather all interested FBOs 
and inform them of the various mass care and other human service capability gaps in 
disaster preparedness, response and recovery, educate them on the specifics and invite 
them to partner with a more veteran organization in an effort to minimize one or more of 
these current gaps. 
The conference development process should include a small concept or 
organizational meeting with the Governor’s Partnership, MOVOAD, SEMA and MIDRO 
representatives to develop an acceptable concept or methodology for presenting the 
various options available to the MIDRO membership. 
The concept meeting is followed by an expanded partner meeting in which the 
Special Needs Taskforce (SNP) MOVOAD, MIDRO, the SEMA Area Coordinators, the 
Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS), the Department of Social Services 
(DSS), the Emergency Management Director Advisory Committee and the Governor’s 
Disaster Recovery Partnership add to the initial concepts by adding their input to the 
selected information tracks on which the conference is structured. Initial interest and 
information indicates these track are like to be infrastructure, community disaster 
response, disaster preparedness and continuity of operations. 
In order to successfully provide assistance to the public, it is important that these 
organizations are capable of sustaining their own routine operations while simultaneously 
assisting with the disaster. Therefore, continuity of operations training with an emphasis 
on how it can positively impact organizational capability to respond should be considered 
essential for the conference participants. 
Once the various faith-based organizations have committed to the process, it is 
equally important that they be partnered with the appropriate organizations to ensure they 
are properly trained and equipped for their chosen role. This does not mean the state will 
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purchase all equipment and supplies necessary for their participation. State and partner 
organizations have a responsibility to provide the guidance and education necessary for 
the participating FBO to understand what equipment, personnel and skill sets are needed 
to effectively prepare for, respond to and assist the public in recovering from a disaster 
within their chosen role. It is then up to the FBO to secure the necessary materials, recruit 
the personnel and work with the partnering organizations, including the state to obtain the 
requisite training for their area of responsibility. 
1. State Level Implementation 
The development of this process begins with a state-level conference targeting the 
senior officials of the various volunteer organizations active throughout the state. This 
conference focuses on educating these senior officials as to the state disaster preparedness 
process and the various opportunities available in which the volunteer organizations may 
participate. This conference is likely to focus more on the faith-based organizations 
because as a body they are much larger than the secular volunteer organizations, but it is 
important to include as many of the secular groups that wish to participate as possible. 
The volunteer officials must understand that their organizations will select a particular 
function within the mass care mission and are expected to work closely with the primary 
voluntary organization assigned that particular responsibility. It is also important that 
everyone understands that this is not a competitive process and that the overall purpose is 
the provision of life saving goods and services to citizens in need. Some of these 
organizations may elect to allow their local chapters, congregations or parishes to 
determine their own role in the process and that is acceptable as long as they follow the 
county/local level process outlined below. 
Once the state FBO conference has been successfully completed and FBO interest 
captured, it should be followed with a series of similar programs, smaller in scale, within 
and specific to each Missouri emergency management area or region of the state. The 
purpose of the area conferences is to attract local interest and solidify partnerships at the 
county and community levels. The vision for this project is to develop the local capacity 
and state coordination capability simultaneously. 
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The nine regional conferences will allow more regional and local volunteer 
leaders to attend. These conferences will be closely coordinated with the county and 
community emergency managers within each area. The same principles and information 
shared at the state conference will be shared with the regional conference attendees. 
Beyond allowing the volunteer organizations to consider assuming potential mass care 
tasks, these conferences are also an opportunity for recruiting interested parties to assist 
in the management of the disaster preparedness and response effort. One must consider 
that as the state builds capacity, it must also build the capability to mange this new 
capacity.  
The state should officially adopt the more streamlined management model 
depicted in Figure 7 below. This model conforms to the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) guidelines that have become the national standard for the management of 
emergencies and disasters. It minimizes the number of personnel and organizations 
managed by any one person or section. It conforms to the current state emergency 
operations center operating guideline format. This model also reinforces the 
responsibility for the mass care function squarely on the shoulders of a state agency that 




Figure 7.   Suggested State EOC Mass Care Structure 
It is necessary to update the state emergency operations plan (SEOP) and the state 
emergency operations center operating guidelines to include the responsibilities of the 
SBC feeding, TSA feeding, ARC sheltering and the Convoy of Hope bulk distribution 
falling mission under ESF-6 and the Department of Social Services. This will formalize 
the process and provide an easily shared documented responsibility. 
This may be done when the SEOP is updated to include the preparedness 
information currently in the stand alone earthquake annex (Annex Y) into the all-hazards 
planning format currently in use for all other Missouri hazards. This should be done as it 
is impractical to maintain two separate planning modalities and much of the information 
contained in Annex Y would prove beneficial if included in the balance of hazards 
included in the rest of the plan. 
Funding should be secured to accomplish this implementation process prior to 
beginning the process. As one will note in Chapter IV, section G adequate funding of this 
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document, the funding necessary to support this program is minimal when balanced 
against the expected return in preparedness and the safety of the citizens. 
One area that should be stressed throughout this process is the need for standards 
in capability. This is accomplished through the selection process of the individual 
volunteers, matching their physical and mental ability with the particular tasks for which 
they are selected. It is also accomplished through the adoption of a standardized training 
program throughout the state for each mass care mission or task. These standards should 
be agreed upon by the volunteer organizations and the state. This training will be 
provided to the volunteer organizations by the State Emergency Management Agency, 
the Department of Social Services, local emergency managers and the primary volunteer 
organizations. Once standardized, this training should be institutionalized within the state 
agencies and volunteer organizations through the building of training cadre within these 
organizations. Institutionalization allows the indefinite sustainment of the training. The 
success of this program is dependent on the inclusion of the local emergency 
management in this process. Without their active support throughout the building and 
coordination process the desired structure can not be achieved.  
Once the volunteers and their respective organizations have formally joined the 
program and been effectively trained, it is important to keep them engaged in disaster 
preparedness. This could be accomplished through continued training opportunities, but 
is best accomplished through their involvement in disaster exercises. While the state can 
accommodate some of the volunteer community in state-level exercises, the full 
engagement of the volunteer community can be best accomplished at the local and 
regional levels. Therefore, whenever possible the state should provide the greatest 
opportunity possible for the inclusion of the volunteer organizations in these exercises. 
Other options for engaging volunteers may include disaster assistance deployments 
through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), the ARC, in-state 
mutual aid and the Missouri SEMA Disaster Services Human Resource Branch. 
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2. County Level Implementation 
The local emergency management and volunteer organizations should be 
encouraged to fully participate in the regional conferences. This is of critical importance 
as the majority of the volunteer organizational resources reside at the local level. Success 
is not possible without their participation. 
The regional conferences are the best opportunity to recruit volunteer 
organizations that have not traditionally participated in the preparedness process. This is 
best accomplished through the detailed explanation of the integrated emergency 
management system and the volunteer organization’s role in it. Once the organization has 
had an opportunity to discuss the process and decides which specific task(s) or mission(s) 
it would like to pursue, the local emergency manager will work with the volunteer 
organization and the state to incorporate the volunteer organization into the system. 
The inclusion of these volunteer organizations will necessitate the modification of 
the local emergency operations plans and structure to accommodate them. This plan 
modification should be made with the cooperation of the state, and local emergency 
management as well as the affected volunteer organizations. Refer to Figure 8 below for 
the recommended local organizational structure.  
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Figure 8.   Recommended Local Mass Care Response Structure 
As Figure 8 suggests, it is important to link the recruited volunteer organization 
with the primary volunteer organization responsible for the selected task(s). This provides 
the recruited organization access to the primary organization’s operating guidelines as 
well as any of its training programs intended to enhance recruited organization’s 
capability or qualify it for operational participation. Many of these organizations, 
including the primary organizations, do not have the financial resources to accomplish 
training on a large enough scale to meet the requirements of this program. The state will 
have to supplement this training through the use of federal preparedness grants. 
The local emergency management programs must include expanding volunteer 
organizations’ the opportunities to participate in disaster preparedness exercises on a 
regular basis. This will not only allow them to sharpen their skills but also keeps them 
involved and interested. 
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G. ADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS FUNDING 
The Hurricane Katrina response, the multiple severe storm responses within the 
state in 2006 and the current New Madrid Seismic event planning effort created an 
acknowledgment (beyond the responsible volunteer organizations) that the need exists 
within the state for an improved mass care capability. Converting this acknowledgement 
into an effective course of action requires significantly more than good intentions and the 
minimal financial resources committed during a single grant cycle. This requires a view 
divergent from the current course. 
From 2002 through the 2008 federal grant cycle, the state of Missouri committed 
the bulk of the homeland security grant funding as follows (Table 2):92 
Table 2.   Past Homeland Security Funding Allocations by Response Discipline 
Area Amount 
Fire Service and HAZMAT $56,408,694.08 
Law Enforcement $69,615,255.32 
Emergency Medical Service $4,637,577.30 
Interoperable Communications $44,926,339.89 
Mass Care $2,399,517.79 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, only 1.3 percent of the available 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant funding allocated to Missouri was 
dedicated to the enhancement of mass care response.93 Only $245,000.00 of the mass 
care amount above was allocated at the state level; the balance was allocated at the 
regional and local levels. The result is the state allocating approximately .001 percent of 
the available homeland security funding for mass care. The state did not contribute any  
                                                 
92 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “SEMA Electronic Grant Management System,” 
(internally generated report, SEMA Homeland Security Branch, Jefferson City, MO, May 28, 2009). 
93 Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, “SEMA Electronic Grant Management System,” 
(internally generated report, SEMA Homeland Security Branch, Jefferson City, MO, November 6, 2007). 
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general revenue for this purpose during this time. The sheltering requirements emerging 
from the disasters occurring within the last two years have garnered some attention from 
the executive level, but the commensurate level of funding or staffing needed to 
adequately address the issue has not been forthcoming. The author believes the shortfall 
of funding is due to the combination of the traditional emergency response organizations 
having powerful lobby groups who are used to competing for grant funding while the 
volunteer organizations and the responsible state agency remain rather quiet on the 
subject. The primary decision makers for grant disbursement traditionally come from the 
military, fire service, law enforcement or the emergency medical service and tend to fund 
what they understand the best.  
It is important the state recognize that providing the traditional response 
organizations such as fire, EMS and law enforcement with additional tools does greatly 
increase the likelihood that more citizens may be saved during a man-made or natural 
catastrophic event. One must also consider that without a greatly improved mass care 
capability those saved may well perish from the lack of adequate shelter and care 
following their rescue or evacuation. One often overlooked fact of disaster management 
by those not directly involved is that the recovery phase is virtually always of much 
greater length than the response phase. 
It is the volunteer agencies that are most likely left to deal with the human 
services needs after the event and navigate the federal bureaucracy for any available 
assistance. Many do not realize that FEMA recovery assistance project for the Great 
Midwestern flood was initiated on July 9, 1993 and was not completed and closed until 
August 13, 2003. There seems to be a disproportionate amount of resources dedicated to 
disaster response, the phase of disaster management with the shortest duration.  
The fact that past governors have elected not to commit a portion of the limited 
state budget to the enhancement of mass care preparedness does not preclude the 
governor’s office from emphasizing to his/her cabinet that while SEMA is tasked with 
the overall coordination of disaster preparedness within the state through Chapter 44 of 
the Revised Missouri Statutes, the true resources for disaster response and recovery 
capability at the state level lie within the state agencies. The reluctance of these agencies 
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to recognize this fact, their frequently stated position by the career staff that this 
responsibility is not their primary duty, the commitment of minimal personnel and 
funding to support the development of the mass care function will eventually result in the 
failure of the state to adequately support those volunteer organizations involved in the 
relief effort. 
As an example the Department of Social Services includes 8,125 employees 
managing many programs with an annual budget of $6.2 billion dollar budget.94 They 
have committed one full-time employee, two part-time managers and approximately 10 
staff to act as part-time trainers. The full-time emergency manager position is a recent 
development. The two part-time managers perform admirably but are expected to 
effectively manage their sections resulting in a commitment of approximately 10 percent 
of their time devoted to disaster preparedness. The recently identified part-time 
instructors volunteered (in addition to their other primary duties) only as long as they 
only train DSS staff inside the department. 
As it stands at this time, there is very little general revenue funding flowing into 
the mass care preparedness effort and most of available funding is in the form of very few 
part time personnel. One might get the impression that the state is willing to maintain an 
emergency management program only as long as the federal government is paying for it. 
A serious inquiry into the necessary level of general revenue needed to support this effort 
should be initiated. This becomes more urgent as the homeland security grant sources 
continue to reduce in volume. 
To adequately prepare for these events it is expected that the organizational 
education, close coordination, and role specific training required by the proposed 
integration of underutilized non-governmental organizations will require close to a 
$350,000.00 investment for the first year followed by $200,000.00 per annum for the 
subsequent three years, followed by $100,000.00 for annual program continuity. While 
this may appear to be a major investment, the successful integration of additional NGOs 
into the system resulting in the capability to shelter 10 percent of the population of the 
                                                 
94 Missouri Department of Social Services, “Office of the Director,” Department of Social Services, 
http://www.dss.mo.gov/ddo/index.htm (accessed November 7, 2007). 
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state, an increase of 900 percent, makes this program extremely cost effective. The 
current organized shelter capacity of the state of Missouri is less than one percent of the 
population. Figures 9 and 10 below represent the current mass care response capability 
(Figure 9) and the projected mass care response capability (Figure 10), once the author’s 
recommendations have been implemented. 
 
Figure 9.   Current Mass Care Capability within Missouri 95 
                                                 
95 Dante Gliniecki (Missouri State Emergency Management Agency, State Volunteer Coordinator), 
interview by author, April 3, 2008. 
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Figure 10.   Projected Mass Care Capability Based on Recommended Program 
Changes 96 
Comparison of Figures 9 and 10 above demonstrates the significant capability 
increase experience when moving from less than 1 percent shelter capacity currently 
tolerated by the state. Figure 10 indicates the particular areas of increase for each 
organization that result in the achievement of the minimum target shelter capacity of 10 
percent of the affected population within the 47 counties identified in the Mercalli map 
(Figure 2. in Chapter II, subsection B). The ARC has successfully planned disaster shelter 
operations based upon the planning figure that 10 percent of a population within a 
disaster zone will seek public shelter.97 This is the planning standard included in its 
Chapter Disaster Response Planning Template.98 Based on the 2000 census data 
developed b the United States Census Bureau, on which the August 10, 2005 HAZUS 
report is based, 10 percent of the population of the 47 counties identified equates to 
                                                 
96 Gliniecki, interview, April 3, 2008. 
97 Friel, interview. 
98 American Red Cross, “Disaster Planning Template,” (internal document, American Red Cross 
Capital Region Chapter, Jefferson City, MO, 2007), 7. 
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304,805 persons that can be expected to seek public shelter.99 Since a New Madrid 
seismic event of this magnitude is considered by the State Emergency Management 
Agency‘s Mass Care Planning Committee to be the disaster event with the greatest 
impact on the state, it has been determined that 304,805 should be the target number for 
shelter and mass care planning.100 Figure 10 demonstrates the projected capability 
following the implementation of the author’s recommendations based on increases in 
volunteer recruiting, mass care funding, organized planning and efficiencies gained in 
restructuring management.101 
The need exists for a single disaster planning modality focused by strategic 
guidance with a more hierarchal management structure within ESF-6. This strategic 
guidance should include a target capacity for sheltering operations. The more hierarchal 
structure will allow for a better trained, streamlined and potentially more flexible and 
responsive EAF-6 capability. This is due to the volunteer organizations with the most 
experience and capability in a given area to train, exercise and coordinate the response of 
the other volunteer organization under their span of control. This restructuring should be 
coordinated by SEMA and DSS through the Governor’s Disaster Recovery Partnership 
and the MOVOAD.  
A large number of volunteer organizations exist within and outside of the state 
MOVOAD that could be recruited, trained and assigned missions that support the 
existing core organizations greatly expanding response capacity. This increased capacity 
could be further enhanced if each of these organizations were given the responsibility for 
a specific function under the Department of Social Services. This would include disaster 
preparedness as well as response. The recommended assignments are: sheltering-ARC, 
mass feeding-TSA with the Southern Baptist assisting and bulk distribution-Convoy of 
Hope. 
                                                 
99 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “HAZUS-MH: Earthquake Event Report,” 29, 30. 
100 Glinieki, interview, 2009. 
101 Ibid. 
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The adoption of a disaster communication system for the management of ESF-6 is 
critical to the efficient operation of the shelter and its support system. This becomes even 
more important when one considers that the communications systems traditional relied 
upon by ESF-6 are unlikely to be unavailable immediately following a catastrophic New 
Madrid seismic event. Along with this communications system is the need for the 
adoption of the ARC National Shelter System as the formal system for tracking the 
evacuees throughout the sheltering process. 
Additional funding is necessary in order for ESF-6 organizations to effectively 
reorganize and expand their capacity. As this entity is primarily composed of volunteer 
organizations, it does not require the same financial support as a more traditional 
governmental emergency response organization. The funding mentioned is largely for 
seminars, recruiting, planning meetings and the training of the volunteers for their 
intended disaster response tasks. DSS and the SEMA State-wide Volunteer Coordinator 
will also need funding to support the additional full-time staffing necessary to manage 
this expansion of capacity. Remember, when one spends money training a volunteer that 
works for free to accomplish a task, unlike their paid counterparts, one receives a net gain 
every time (s)he performs that task. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The primary disaster strength for mass care within the United States resides at the 
state and local level, and is reinforced by the national volunteer organizations committed 
to assisting the public in time of need. The federal provision of troops, air assets, water, 
ice, packaged meals, blankets and other supplies is helpful, but the strongest weapon in 
the FEMA arsenal is the promise to reimburse state and local governments for expenses 
incurred during the response phase of federally declared disasters. To date, the largest 
participants in this arena are the volunteer organizations, the private sector, and the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Of these participants, only the 
VOLAGs and the private sector are altruistic and are not reimbursed by either the state or 
federal governments. 
Even with all of these available resources a New Madrid seismic event of the 
magnitude discussed here, without notice, would prove devastating to at least eight states. 
The cumulative damage from repetitive quakes and tremors would render a significant 
portion of the structures in eastern Missouri uninhabitable, at least not safely inhabitable. 
The federal government does not have the physical resources or trained personnel 
necessary to shelter large portions of the population. This responsibility falls to the states. 
As the experiences borne of Hurricane Katrina and the more routine disasters 
within the state of Missouri have demonstrated, there is a shortfall of the necessary 
detailed planning, trained personnel, identified ARC certified shelters and overall mass 
care coordination within the state. At the present time the state of Missouri can 
adequately shelter less than one percent of the state population and .049 percent of the 
expected citizens expected to be displaced by a catastrophic New Madrid seismic 
event.102 The experts within the state agree, given the results of the Missouri Hazard 
Analysis, that the minimum acceptable shelter level within Missouri is 10 percent of the 
resident population within the affected area.103 
                                                 
102 Glinieki, interview, 2009. 
103 Ibid. 
 84
The remediation of the deficit between the current mass care capability and the 
projected need within Missouri requires a paradigm shift in approach. The state of 
Missouri could effectively meet the goal of 10 percent shelter capability through a serious 
commitment to capacity building through the development of a formal and more 
structured state vision and leadership by the executive and state agencies responsible for 
mass care. This should be followed by more detailed planning, and the selection of one 
planning modality and thoroughly utilizing its capability.104 
SEMA, ARC, SBC, TSA and the Convoy of Hope already have an effective 
partnership with the ARC, SBC, TSA and the Convoy of Hope adopting the ARC 
doctrine training, and methodology. This is a progressive move that has borne positive 
fruit during the last two disasters within the state and should be not only encouraged, but 
expanded to include the many other volunteer organizations within the state. Many of 
these volunteer organizations already participate in disaster response, but need to be 
included in the formal system so they may be properly trained, certified and added to the 
predicted resource or supply system. This way they become effective partners within the 
system rather than a drain on it.  
The inclusion of the other volunteer organizations within the more vertical system 
will allow the ARC to include those shelters in their National Shelter System, allowing 
the state to more accurately monitor the flow of displaced persons and more adequately 
route resources fro their support. It is important that state and local governments target 
the faith-based community for inclusion in the system. Also of importance is the 
commitment by the state to research the potential development of an information sharing 
or communications network that will meet the needs of the mass care system. The new 
state MERIS system may meet the need for communication, but will need to be 
supplemented with the ARC National Shelter System and another system for tracking 
displaced persons. Further study is needed to determine the feasibility of integrating these 
systems.  
                                                 
104 Selecting either the All-hazards planning model or the individual plan for each threat model 
instead of a combination of the two, neither of which is complete. 
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One can not discuss mass care capacity building without also discussing the 
mobilization of the citizenry. It is important that the state and local leaders awaken the 
populace by describing the need for them to volunteer and go to training in order to 
qualify for the particular service for which they volunteered. It is a common belief among 
the volunteer community within emergency management that most citizens would gladly 
give of their time if they only knew what was needed to support their fellow citizens. It is 
incumbent upon the local and state leadership to assist in the call for volunteerism and the 
education of the public that individuals can make a difference. This is followed up by the 
emergency management field routing these potential volunteers to the structured 
volunteer organizations that best know how to train and make use of their skills. The 
volunteer organizations must keep them engaged and interested so their skills are still 
sharp and available when the next disaster strikes. This engagement may take the form of 
participating in the organizations more routine duties, attending additional training 
courses and participating in local and state disaster exercises. 
The development of community preparedness relies on much more that the 
provision of an adequate number of volunteers. They must be part of an organized and 
formal preparedness effort. The connection between the local community and the state is 
critical for success. To effectively complete this connection, the state should have an 
ESF-6 liaison in each county of the state and, if possible, in each community of sufficient 
size. The function of this liaison would be to assist in the planning and preparedness 
program at the local and state levels, ensuring a positive connection and progressive flow 
of information and potential resources in both directions. Without this direct continual 
connection the system will likely break down and become dysfunctional. 
It is one thing to discuss enhanced planning, capacity building through 
encouraging volunteerism, communication systems, active leadership and the other facets 
of building an effective mass care response capability, but unless the state reverses the 
past trend to significantly under fund ESF-6, the state will maintain the geographically 
intermittent one percent shelter capability that currently exists. Due to the reliance on 
volunteers for ESF-6, it is one of the few areas that do not require a one to one ratio of 
dollars-in to dollars-out in benefit. Since there are no salaries and benefit packages to 
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consider, there is little expense in sustaining volunteers beyond their initial recruitment 
and training. This is a tremendous return on investment for the government and volunteer 
agencies paying for the initial training. The challenge is to recognize that this is a critical 
area involving the life safety of citizens and should be treated at least with equal 
importance as the traditional fire service, law enforcement or emergency medical services 
currently enjoy. 
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